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Online advertising is consistently considered as the pillar of the “free” content on the
Web. By giving websites a way of financing their operation, advertising would be
preventing users from being charged for the content consumed on the Web. Besides
promoting content creation, this revolution of the marketing business created a myriad
of new opportunities for advertisers to reach potential customers at the right time.
Furthermore, the option of delivering personalized ads has turned advertising into
a service that can be really valuable for end users, who thank receiving ads tailored
to their interests. Given its apparent success in getting paying customers, online
advertising is fueling a billionaire business in which the largest tech companies are
involved.
The current advertising model builds upon an intricate infrastructure composed
of a variety of intermediary entities and technologies whose main aim is to deliver
personalized ads. For this purpose, a wealth of user data is collected, aggregated, pro-
cessed and traded behind the scenes at an unprecedented rate. Despite the enormous
value of online advertising, however, the intrusiveness and ubiquity of these practices
prompt serious privacy concerns.
In view of the inherent complexity behind the operation of ad platforms, and
given the tons of personal data they use as raw material, privacy risks in the online
advertising ecosystem could be studied from multiple perspectives. Naturally, most of
the efforts unveiling these privacy issues concentrate on a specific entity, technology,
behavior or context where user privacy is put at risk. However, such a segmented
approach might underestimate the benefits of a wider vision of a problem that is
systemic.
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In this line, a lot of privacy protection mechanisms have been proposed from the
industry and academia. The most popular ones resort to radical strategies that hinder
the ad distribution process, thus seriously affecting the online advertising ecosystem
(and its benefits). Others involve significantly changing the ecosystem which unfortu-
nately may not be suitable in these times. Consequently, to encourage the adoption
of privacy protection in this context, it is fundamental to pose mechanisms that aim
at balancing the trade-off between user privacy and the web business model.
First, in this thesis we deal with the need to have a wide perspective of the privacy
risks for users within the online advertising ecosystem and the protection approaches
available. For this, we survey the online advertising infrastructure and its supporting
technologies, and present a thorough overview of the underlying privacy risks and the
solutions that may mitigate them. Through a systematic effort, we analyze the threats
and potential privacy attackers in this scenario of online advertising. In particular, we
examine the main components of the advertising infrastructure in terms of tracking
capabilities, data collection, aggregation level and privacy risk, and overview the
tracking and data-sharing technologies employed by these components. Then, we
conduct a comprehensive survey of the most relevant privacy mechanisms, and classify
and compare them on the basis of their privacy guarantees and impact on the Web.
Subsequently, we study the privacy risks derived from real-time bidding, a key
enabling technology of modern online advertising. In essence, we experimentally ex-
plore how the process of user data sharing, necessary to support the auction-based
system in online advertising, could be abused, at a very low cost and at the expense
of user privacy. To mitigate this abuse, we propose a system to regulate the distribu-
tion user tracking data to potentially interested entities, depending on their previous
behavior. This consists in minimizing the number of advertising agencies to which
user data is shared while leaving unchanged the current architecture and protocols.
Doing so may have an evident impact on the ad platform’s revenue, thus the proposed
system is designed accordingly to ensure the revenue is maximized while the abuse
by advertising agencies is prevented to a large degree. Experimentally, the results of
evaluation seem to suggest that this system is able to correct misbehaving entities,
consequently enhancing user privacy.
vii
Finally, we analyze the impact of online advertising and tracking from the partic-
ular perspective of Iberoamerica. We study the third-party and ad tracking triggered
within local websites in this heterogenous region not previously studied. We found
out that user location in this context would affect user privacy since the intensity
of third-party traffic, including advertising related flows of information, varies from
country to country when local web traffic is simulated, although the total number of
entities behind this traffic seems stable in this context. The potential online tracking
varies also when visits are simulated from European to Latin American countries and
it increases when top-world sites are tested. The type of content served by websites
is also a parameter affecting the level of third-party tracking: publishers associated
with news/media or shopping/travel categories generate more third-party traffic
and such intensity is exacerbated for top-world sites. We corroborate some of these
findings and others, related to the concentration of third-party traffic in a few com-
panies, by exploiting the transparency advertising standard ads.txt.
viii
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Advertising is an activity as old as commerce because, naturally, any product has to
be promoted first to then be more easily sold. Such promotion entails establishing
a communication channel with customers that in the past used media such as radio
and TV. However, the technological progress in recent times has brought automated
and intelligent mechanisms to capture the attention of potential customers worldwide
through the Web.
Taken to an online context, advertising has developed its maximum potential
thanks to the multiple capabilities offered. The fundamental innovation consisted
in enabling advertising platforms to effectively select and deliver information to the
right potential customers [2–4]. Implemented through a programmatic strategy, this
approach has revolutionized the advertising business to the point that some of the
biggest tech companies in the world (Google and Facebook) obtain much of their
revenues from advertising. Also, to some extent, the free content created by millions
of websites along the world is financed by online advertising.
Personalization is one of the key characteristics of modern online advertising.
This implies distributing ads according to the specific interests of users, which is
significantly more effective than broadcasting untargeted ads. Another fundamental
aspect of online advertising is its efficiency in generating revenue through automated
auctions, thus selling ad spaces only to the highest bidder. Evidently, real-time
processes are incorporated to auction user impressions and distribute personalized
1
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ads while a web page is displayed. Furthermore, several interfaces are provided to
advertisers and other intermediary entities to enable transparency and to give them
granular control over their bid strategy.
Having billions of users reachable, a very complex infrastructure has been estab-
lished to implement the aforementioned services. Not only advertisers and websites
are involved in this infrastructure but also more specialized entities that implement
complex capabilities such as personalization or automated auctioning and that coor-
dinate the operation among the different components of the online advertising ecosys-
tem.
The raw material of personalized online advertising is user information. Its ex-
ploitation allows to unveil user behavior and infer potential interests. This is an
important insight advertising platforms employ to direct ads to the right users. Its
great effectiveness is based on the tons of data collected from users browsing the Web.
Through different interfaces, part of this information is traded from specialized
data marketers. In addition, while a user impression is auctioned, his information is
shared with the advertising agencies interested in order to help them guide their bid
decisions. The current structure of the online advertising landscape is thus strongly
dependent on releasing user data to third-parties.
Unfortunately, such user data involves sensitive attributes whose release and mis-
use imply serious security and privacy risks [5–7], in particular because hundreds of
intermediary entities are involved and receive this information when participating in
auctions. In addition to data disclosure, other characteristics of the online advertising
ecosystem exacerbate privacy concerns. Mainly, the mechanisms that make personal-
ized advertising so effective can be decidedly intrusive, to the point that users perceive
said intrusion as degradation of their browsing experience [8–10]. For instance, online
tracking of users along the Web, to build granular behavioral profiles, is massively per-
formed in advertising platforms, to target potential customers, without their consent
and even their knowledge. These profiles are built, among other things, on informa-
tion derived from the users’ browsing activity, e.g., browsing history, IP address of
the user device, operating system, or plug-ins installed [4, 11,12].
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With the aim of maximizing profit, the online advertising ecosystem has facilitated
the exploitation of user data, but has also encouraged the participation of advertising
agencies. In this context, when the advertising platform calls for participation in the
auction of a user impression, the distribution of user data that potential participants
receive is basically unregulated.
This lack of regulation along with the pervasiveness of online tracking and adver-
tising provide fertile ground for the implementation of a massive surveillance platform.
Besides, despite the transparency provided to advertising entities, online advertising
is supported by a completely opaque infrastructure in front of users. Namely, no
information or control are granted by default for users to manage their data in this
scenario.
Interestingly, beyond the release of user data, privacy risks essentially derive from
the potential misuse of this data when flowing through the advertising ecosystem [13].
Such misuse might lead to characterize users as more relevant than others, depending
on their behavior [14]; such a differentiation may provoke discrimination [15], a natural
effect of privacy violation.
As privacy risks were not enough, the adoption of protection mechanisms in this
landscape is discouraged by the complexity and opacity behind the whole structure of
ad platforms. Namely, several protection approaches from the academia are unfeasible
in practice since its implementation would significantly change such structure and,
then, the economic model of online advertising platforms. Moreover, other solutions
released by the industry, although applicable and very popular in current times,
aim at directly hindering third-party interactions from the user side. This radical
approach, effective and highly accepted among users, also entails a serious threat for
the economic model of the online advertising ecosystem, and thus of that of the Web.
Since privacy risks in this scenario are intricate and the protection efforts so frag-
mented or sometimes impractical, a deep analysis of the involved entities, relation-
ships and parameters could help to better characterize the threat scenario and thus
to propose more long-term and constructive solutions for the privacy problem.
When studying this issue, we have to recognize that the lack of information regard-
ing the internal processes of ad platforms might complicate an experimental research
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on privacy threats. However, third-party interactions from the user’s browser are
easier to study and could reveal interesting notions of how online tracking and ad-
vertising could impact on the privacy of users, and how such impact is dependent on
external influences, e.g., legislation or users’ location.
Addressing these issues could help us not only unveil the serious risks behind
online advertising but also build a more privacy-friendly ecosystem.
1.1 Objectives
Inspired by the aforementioned issues of the online advertising ecosystem, in this
dissertation we have two main objectives. The first one is oriented to research on
the privacy risks inherent to the online advertising ecosystem. The second objective
encompasses designing a mechanism aimed at protecting user privacy while not sig-
nificantly affecting the current revenue model. To accomplish these objectives, we
first develop a general but comprehensive analysis of the privacy risks in this complex
scenario. A general and systematic overview of the available protection mechanisms
will also be performed. Moreover, in a more specific effort, we investigate the pri-
vacy threats derived from distributing personal information within the core of online
advertising platforms. Given the automated and internal mechanism driving this pro-
cess and how easily third parties get involved, serious concerns arise. To solve this
particular problem, we design a mechanism to regulate the distribution of user data
in online ad platforms according to the previous behavior of participant third parties.
This approach will consider not only limiting the number of third parties, but also
the maximization of ad platform’s revenue. Finally, we experimentally analyze po-
tential privacy risks related to online tracking and advertising from the perspective of
the third-party interactions triggered from the user side. Bounded to a geographical
context not explored yet, we verify whether parameters such as legislation or location
affect the exposition of users to online tracking and advertising.
Bellow we provide with more details regarding these objectives.
• Privacy risks. We survey the online advertising infrastructure and its sup-
porting technologies with the aim of performing a thorough overview of the
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underlying privacy risks and the solutions that may mitigate them. For this, we
examine the main components of the advertising ecosystem in terms of tracking
capabilities, data collection, aggregation level and privacy risk, and overview the
tracking and data-sharing technologies employed by these components. Based
on this first approach, we conduct a comprehensive survey of the most rele-
vant privacy mechanisms, and classify and compare them on the basis of their
privacy guarantees and impact on the Web.
We also investigate, more experimentally, the privacy risks derived from the
real-time auction of user impressions within ad platforms. In particular, this
analysis will be focused on the unregulated distribution of information, including
user data, to advertising agencies, which could lead to the creation of a massive
surveillance structure on top of the online advertising ecosystem.
Still in line with revealing privacy risks, we concentrate on the user side and
the third-party interactions triggered from there when browsing the Web. By
studying such communications, we measure the influence of online tracking and
advertising, particularly on Iberoamerican countries.
• Privacy protection. We design and evaluate a system to mitigate the impact
on privacy provoked by the unregulated distribution of information to third par-
ties within ad platforms. We propose a mechanism to restrict the participation
of such third parties when ad platforms share tracking data. A strategy will be
designed to preserve the revenue while potential abuse is detected.
1.2 Summary of Contributions
Below, we list the main contributions of this thesis.
• We systematically survey the current state-of-the-art of academic and industry
solutions that aim at protecting Web users from various privacy threats posed
by the online advertising industry. To this end, we characterize the capabilities
of the components involved in the ad-delivery process, in terms of type and
scope of data collection, aggregation level, and, accordingly, privacy threat.
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• Motivated by the previous analysis of privacy risks, we develop a comprehensive
overview of the protection mechanisms that may cope with such threats. These
mechanisms are examined, among other aspects, on the basis of the location
of the mechanism employed, the scope of its application and its protection
strategy. We concentrate on those privacy mechanisms that operate on the user
side, since the opacity of online ad platforms difficult further research inside.
Our review of privacy mechanisms establishes a correspondence between the
privacy risks identified and the proposals, both from academia and industry,
that may address them.
• We experimentally evidence the potential misuse of real-time bidding, a key
technology supporting the online advertising ecosystem, by which user data is
distributed among third parties as background information in the process of
auctioning a user impression. We quantify the extent to which an advertising
agency may collect user tracking data without even paying for it.
• In order to cope with the aforementioned issue, we conceive a system that aims
at regulating the distribution of user data to third parties during the auctions
for ad-impressions, i.e., to whom send the requests for each ad-space bidding.
Limiting the number of third parties receiving user profiles naturally offer better
privacy protection, especially since potential dishonest entities will hardly re-
ceive user sensitive information under such context. We formulate the problem
of choosing a distribution strategy as a multi-objective optimization problem
that takes into account both aspects, i.e., the number of entities receiving in-
formation and ad platform’s profits.
• Lastly, we investigate the privacy issues in online advertising from the perspec-
tive of the interactions triggered from the user side to ad related third-parties.
We focus on a novel scenario that involves online tracking and advertising
spawned by local websites in Iberoamerican countries. In particular, we aim
at finding out how user location and content type served by publishers impact
on potential third-party tracking and privacy risks.
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and J. Forné, “Does k-anonymous microaggregation affect machine learned
macrotrends?,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 28 258–28 277, May 2018. ISSN:
2169-3536. Impact factor 2018: 4.098 [23].
Conference publications:
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1.4 Outline of this Thesis
We detail below the structure of this dissertation which follows the objectives defined
in Sec. 1.1.
Chapter 2 introduces the main concepts with regard to the online advertising
ecosystem. This includes a brief history of its evolution over time, a succinct descrip-
tion of the main players, and the technologies supporting ad displaying. Privacy issues
derived from online advertising and related protection approaches are also introduced
in this chapter.
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Chapter 3 presents a systematic survey of the online advertising infrastructure,
including a deep analysis of the solutions available to mitigate such risks. The main
components of this ecosystem, its capabilities and the technologies supporting inher-
ent processes are studied in this chapter. Such parameters are then matched with
potential privacy abuses. Also, an analysis of several privacy protection approaches is
presented along with a categorization of these tools according to their specific scope
of application.
Chapter 4 proposes examining a particular privacy risk arising, within advertising
platforms, from the uncontrolled distribution of personal information to third parties.
Afterwards, a cost-effective mitigation mechanism is presented.
Chapter 5 is devoted to measure online tracking and advertising in the context of
Iberoamerican countries. The impact of privacy risks depending on the location of
users and websites are also discussed in this chapter.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Introduction
Selecting and directing information are crucial in every aspect of our modern lives,
including areas as diverse as health, leisure and research. In the past, these processes
were largely manual, but due to the exponential improvements in computation and
sophistication of software, they are becoming increasingly automated.
The industry of online advertising, lavishly illustrated by Google DoubleClick
and real-time bidding (RTB), is an example of the ever-growing automation of these
processes, and another crucial aspect of our society — to a large extent, the success of
most competitive economic activities is dependent on advertising, particularly on the
ability to effectively select and direct information to the right potential customers.
Undoubtedly, the advent of the Internet and the Web has created a myriad of new
opportunities for advertisers to target billions of people almost effortlessly. However,
online advertising is not only ubiquitous. In the early days of the Web, ads were
served directly by the publisher (i.e., the page’s owner) following a one-size-fits-all
approach. But due to the ease with which Web users can be tracked across their page
visits, online advertising has also become increasingly personalized. An example of
the sophistication of ad personalization is RTB, which enables advertisers to direct
10
2.1 INTRODUCTION 11






HTTP cookies Flash cookies 
DoNotTrackMe 
Lightbeam 











Figure 2.1: Word cloud of terms related to online advertising, tracking, user profiling, and privacy
solutions in this scenario. We discuss all these terms in this chapter. The font size of each of them
is proportional to the frequency of occurrence in Google search.
ads to the right user and at the right time, by competing in real-time auctions for
the impression of their ads [25].
Evidently, personalized advertising is the most effective, and hence the most prof-
itable, form of advertising. Those ads relying on a user’s browsing interests ensure
conversion rates(a) that double those of untargeted ads [26]. On the other hand, from
the publishers’ perspective, online advertising is the pillar that sustains the Internet’s
“free” content and services.
Nevertheless, advertisers and publishers are not the only entities taking part in
this business. In fact, there exists an entire infrastructure at the service of both of
them, supported by companies like Google, Facebook and Twitter. Enabled by these
and hundreds of other ad companies, targeting mechanisms take charge of selecting
and directing ads to billions of users everyday, depending on a number of factors such
as the page they are visiting; their browsing history; their IP address or parts of it;
their operating system; the plug-ins installed and other information related to their
Web browser [4, 11, 12]; and obviously the objectives and budgets of all advertisers
for displaying their ads.
User information is therefore an asset fundamental to the efficient and effective
delivery of advertising, which is not only handed over to the highest bidder, but to
many other third parties that are involved in the ad-delivery process. Unfortunately,
(a)In online marketing terminology, conversion usually means the act of converting Web site visitors
into paying customers.
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evident security risks exist for users when personal, sensitive data about their habits
are traded in the name of personalized advertising by an infrastructure that operates
in the shadows with virtually no oversight [27]. These security risks can be explained
in terms of privacy hazards, social sorting, discrimination, malware distribution, fraud
and others [5] [6] [7].
Regarding privacy, serious concerns have been raised by the intrusiveness of prac-
tices and the increasing invasiveness of digital advertising. According to recent sur-
veys, two out of three Internet users are worried about the fact that their online
behavior be scrutinized without their knowledge and consent. Numerous studies in
this same line reflect the growing level of ubiquity and abuse of advertising, which is
perceived by users as a significant degradation of their browsing experience [8] [9] [10].
In an attempt to mitigate these privacy and security risks, several approaches
have been proposed by a heterogeneous group of actors. Research proposals have
concentrated on sophisticated mechanisms to anonymize or block the information
leaked to third-parties while trying to remain compatible with the current ecosystem.
On the other hand, commercial solutions have primarily focused on blocking tracking
mechanisms at the cost of seriously damaging the Internet business model.
2.2 Evolution of the Online Advertising Landscape
Advertising is commonly linked to commercial activities that involve branding strate-
gies intended to draw the attention of potential customers. The objective of drawing
attention is persuading users to buy a product or, generally, spawning brand image.
Historically, however, the way potential customers have been contacted by advertisers
to apply such strategies has ended up bothering the ones they aimed at attracting [28].
The main problem of classical online advertising has been commonly the very lim-
ited media infrastructure by which ads have been distributed to customers. Without
enough resources to target users (e.g., TV viewers or newspaper readers), advertisers
used to massively flood the available media with ads which very few people were inter-
ested in [29]. The flooded message usually “touched” some customers but the strategy
2.2 EVOLUTION OF THE ONLINE ADVERTISING LANDSCAPE 13
was definitely inefficient. Currently, marketing announcements are still sent to an au-
dience that has a huge aggregate size but which is also ultra-fragmented [30] [31].
This is due to the broad range of available media channels (TV channels, websites,
etc.) and the volatility of the attention users put on such channels [32].
Despite its shortcomings, online advertising has been a profitable business and
proved to be effective in terms of ROI (b), interaction and tracing of potential cus-
tomers, and reaching an audience [33]. The truth is also that, in the past, audiences
were not as fragmented, and the online ecosystem was not as congested as it is cur-
rently. As a result, there were more chances for such traditional advertising strategies
to be successful.
With the rise of the Internet, the advertising industry has evolved significantly,
especially in terms of its capability of reaching potential customers on an individual
basis. Modern online advertising takes advantage of recommendation and person-
alized information systems to tailor advertising campaigns to the interests of Web
users [34]. Thus, thanks to technologies like RTB, the core of the advertising busi-
ness is able to show ads to the right person and at the right time, which implies
greater effectiveness [7,35,36]. Additionally, current online advertising provides more
accountability and transparency since ad companies are encouraged to agree on prices
that directly match the effort undertaken by the seller with the benefits received by
the buyer. Consequently, in economic terms, advertising services are traded based on
the force of demand and supply [4].
Although online media have transformed the way advertising is conceived, it was
not always so. The online environment was originally overwhelmed by confusion where
the impact and fulfillment of advertising campaigns were hardly determined objec-
tively [7, 11]. For instance, advertisers had to acquire inventory of spaces available
to publish ads without really knowing if such spaces were shown to people interested
in the promoted products. Moreover, the lack of resources of the emerging advertis-
ing technologies of that time prevented online actors from optimizing the ad-delivery
process.
(b)ROI or return on investment is an indicator used to measure the efficiency of an investment.
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At present, the online advertising landscape is triggered by advertisers, who cre-
ate the demand, and publishers, who generate the supply. Websites have become the
publishers by excellence since the content they offer attracts people whose interests
can be revealed from intrinsic interactions with the Web. Moreover, modern meth-
ods of online advertising management have incorporated intermediate entities that
help advertisers and publishers navigate the web topology in order to connect them
together [7]. Such intermediaries, as explained below, are responsible for providing
interactive and automatic ad serving that is able to accurately target the intended
audience. The targeting strategy implemented by these intermediary entities has di-
rectly influenced the ad-personalization accuracy, but also the level of transparency
of the process whereby ads are delivered.
Lastly, it is worth stressing that the money produced by online advertising is
currently sustaining most of the “free” content on the Web [37]. The money paid by
advertisers becomes revenues that are distributed among the different actors of the
ecosystem, including the publisher [11].
2.3 Online Advertising Players
The modern online advertising infrastructure has become certainly complex and dy-
namic and, although more players can be identified, three components deploy the
main roles in this industry. As illustrated in Fig. 2.2, these components are advertis-
ers, publishers and ad platforms, and their ultimate goal is to display the right ad to
the right user [4] [38]. The former two components represent respectively the demand
and supply sides of the economic model that governs an online advertising service [7].
The interactions between such players are commonly enabled by an intermediate in-
frastructure called ad platform. Finally, users, whose data and requests are the basis
of the decisions made for online advertising services, are not directly considered as
part of this infrastructure since they do not receive the revenues of such billion-dollar
business.






Figure 2.2: Main components of the online advertising ecosystem.
Advertisers are entities that are interested in promoting a brand or product
by showing related ads to potential customers. They are willing to pay for display-
ing their ads [4] [38], and therefore they are the entities that generate the demand
of advertising services. Online advertisers are basically aimed at displaying ads on
some spaces of the websites (publishers) users visit. Direct agreements may be signed
among advertisers and publishers to regulate the online ad service, but these actors
commonly get engaged through intermediate platforms, as shown in Fig. 2.2. Obvi-
ously, the use of intermediary entities makes this process more efficient. Thanks to
these entities, advertisers may target ads to the intended audience of their market-
ing campaigns. Also, through modern online advertising mechanisms like RTB, they
may participate directly in this targeting process. These capabilities are crucial for
advertisers to face the fragmentation of online audiences.
A publisher is an entity, such as CNN or The New York Times, which provides
online content (e.g., newspapers, search engines, blogs, etc.), usually through web
pages. Since such content draws the attention of users, advertisers pay publishers to
be assigned a space in a website, where they can show ads to a given audience. Com-
monly, publishers supply advertisers with an inventory of spaces (on their websites)
to be filled with marketing messages. Such inventory can be sold by contract or in
real time. As depicted in Fig. 2.3, a publisher is the entity through which a user
comes into contact with the online advertising ecosystem.
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Figure 2.3: Disaggregated ad platform scheme and interactions between players.
Ad platforms are groups of entities that connect advertisers with publishers
through their demand and supply-side interfaces. In particular, as can be seen in
Fig. 2.3, ad platforms constitute the marketplace where the demand and the supply of
online advertising services are matched [4]. In order to effectively reach the currently
fragmented online audiences (i.e., a multitude of websites and a pretty scattered
attention of users), ad platforms arose to help advertisers and publishers increase
the selectivity and efficiency of ad space allocation. Therefore, ad platforms may
be considered as the centerpiece of the modern Internet advertising business as they
facilitate the matching between the advertising material and users’ interests. The
accuracy of said matching clearly depends on the ad platforms’ ability to track and
profile users based on the information that can be mined from their online activity.
The ad-targeting process has in recent years become increasingly sophisticated, which
has inevitably led to the emergence of numerous agents with very specialized roles.
The upshot of this more populated ecosystem (see Fig. 2.3) is a more automatic,
transparent and flexible ad-delivery process. Throughout this work, we refer to ad
platforms as all the intermediary entities that connect advertisers to publishers.
Originally, ad platforms used to aggregate only the inventory provided by pub-
lishers. The aim was to help advertisers get scale and impact (in terms of amount)
when distributing their ads; however, scale was not enough. Later, modern ad plat-
forms brought a more transparent infrastructure where advertisers became capable
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of selecting the users to which they wanted to show ads. To this end, ad platforms
integrated certain mechanisms to make the ad-targeting process more accurate, trans-
parent and flexible. Such mechanisms are now implemented by different entities that
are part of ad platforms. These entities provide complementary services including
aggregation of demand and supply, and optimization of the ad-serving process itself.
Some of these entities are ad networks, ad exchanges, and demand and supply-side
platforms [7]. Ad networks and ad exchanges are the predecessors of ad platforms.
Ad networks began aggregating inventory for advertisers, and ad exchanges evolved
to include more dynamic mechanisms to serve ads through automated auctions [39].
Ad networks emerged to help advertisers select and buy ad spaces across the
congested and fragmented ad-serving infrastructure. With this aim, such networks
used to resell the aggregated ad inventory acquired from publishers to advertisers
and related agencies [39]. For those publishers that directly sold their inventory to
big advertisers, ad networks became an interesting entity through which to sell their
remnant inventory for a good price [11]. Other smaller ad networks were able to give
advertisers access to more selective audiences by aggregating more specific inventory
from small publishers. Examples of ad networks include Google AdSense, Media.net
and PulsePoint.
Ad exchanges are ad platforms that currently sell their aggregated inventory of
ad spaces by means of auctions. They keep consolidating ad spaces from publishers
but offer advertisers and publishers more effective and transparent mechanisms to
serve ads [4, 40]. First, ad exchanges place ads based on automated auctions where
advertisers “decide” how much to pay for an ad space. The winning bidder is the
advertiser that ends up displaying the ad. Secondly, during the auction, ad exchanges
share with advertisers contextual information about the user who generates the im-
pression they bid for. Such information helps advertisers decide whether to bid for
an ad space and how much to bid for it. The auction is held just after a user re-
quests content from a website partnering with the ad exchange. The whole process
may take a few tenths of a second. Theoretically, this yields greater efficiency since
the ad-delivery process is distributed among the different components of the ad plat-
form [11]. Part of the aggregation strategy of ad exchanges consists in combining
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multiple ad networks together. This way, advertisers and publishers are relieved from
dealing with so many intermediaries.
Demand-side platforms (DSPs) are entities that work for advertisers, i.e., for
the actors generating the demand of ad services. DSPs work on behalf of advertisers,
in front of the ad exchange, and help advertisers choose audiences and adequate
media to display their ads. By aggregating demand, DSPs are capable of boosting
selectiveness and effectiveness for advertisers [4, 11].
Supply-side platforms (SSPs) are entities that work on behalf of publishers,
the actors that supply ad spaces to advertisers. SSPs offer publishers an optimized
strategy to manage their advertising inventory. Since the task of targeting an ad to a
given user involves advanced capabilities and resources, publishers delegate this task
to SSPs, with the hope of getting increased demand and profits, despite the congested
online ecosystem.
Data aggregators are entities that collect information about Internet users with
the aim of profiling their purchasing interests. Data aggregators’ services aim at
tailoring ad marketing strategies to the users’ preferences they have learned by means
of massive data mining. From data aggregators, another entity called data exchange
arises. Data exchanges provide demand and supply-side platforms as well as ad
exchanges with user data to help them make their targeting decisions.
General Operation of Online Advertising
Having shown the main components of the online advertising ecosystem, now we
proceed to briefly describe how ads are delivered on the Web.
Currently, ad serving aims at providing automated processes and transparent
interactions to advertising entities. However, there are many interactions involved
that make the ad-serving process really complex and completely opaque to the user.
In general, when a user visits a website, personalized advertisements are displayed
together with the content of the site, as if they were part of the same structure.
According to the user’s perception, ads seem to be served by the same web server.
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Figure 2.4: Current online advertising architecture composed by publishers, ad platforms and ad-
vertisers.
Although the user participation in the ad-serving process is merely passive, the entire
process is triggered by a user’s request to download Web content.
This way, when a user’s browser sends an HTTP request to a website that is
associated with an ad exchange, the website sends back the content the user is re-
questing. Such content is interpreted by the browser and then displayed to the user.
Along with the content, additional code, in the form of ad tags, is sent to the browser
and executed automatically. The execution of this code triggers a connection from
the browser to the ad exchange in question, which asks for advertisements to fill the
ad spaces on the visited page. When the ad exchange receives the ad call, the process
of selecting the right ad for the best price is performed by some of the intermediary
entities described above. Mechanisms such as RTB and cookie matching (CM) are
used to ensure the greatest impact on users (which benefits advertisers) together with
the highest profits for the ad-serving platform (which includes publishers). Figure 2.4
shows the current architecture of online advertising composed mainly by publishers,
ad platforms and advertisers, and illustrates the process whereby third-party ads are
displayed to users.
The ad-delivering process requires that publishers include a link to the ad platform
they want to partner with (1); for the sake of simplicity, we consider here a single ad
platform. When a user visits pages partnering with this ad platform, the browser is
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instructed to load the URLs provided by the ad platform. Through the use of third-
party cookies and other tracking mechanisms, the ad platform is able to track all
these visits and build a browsing profile (2). Based on this profile, the user’s location
and other parameters, the ad platform uses its targeting algorithm to decide which
ad to present on the publisher’s page
2.4 Supporting Technologies
The ad-serving process has significantly evolved from the days when advertisers se-
lected the media to deploy ads long before a user visited a website. Currently, ad-
vertisers may decide, in real time, which ad to display. As described in Sec. 2.3, ad
platforms take in the order of milliseconds to target an ad to a user based on their
preferences and the campaign requirements specified by the advertiser in question.
Two main processes are involved. On the one hand, a behavioral profiling task is con-
ducted against a visiting user; this is done on the basis of any information collected
about them [35]. On the other hand, automated auctions are used to distribute ads
in favor of advertisers, in accordance with their willingness to bid for a particular
profiled user.
Although behavioral profiling and real-time auctioning are key processes for mod-
ern online advertising, they would not be feasible without online tracking. Online
tracking enables the collection of the user information that is afterwards employed as
input for user profiling and bidding decision making.
Mechanisms such as CM and RTB have been developed to support the modern
online advertising platforms, by facilitating ad serving personalization and enabling
a more efficient and profitable ad distribution system. In the coming subsections, we
overview these two mechanisms and online tracking.
Cookie Matching
In order to decide whether and how much to bid for users’ impressions, online ad-
vertisers require as much information as possible about such users. To come to that
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decision, the first task of ad platforms is to individuate users so that different at-
tributes can be associated with a (almost) single virtual identity. CM is a mechanism
that assists an online advertising platform, and in general a web tracker, in “recog-
nizing” users across the Web. As we explain later on, said assistance is key to the
bidding processes [41].
CM is based on cookies, which are randomly generated strings of text that web
servers send to users’ browsers. Cookies are employed to recognize users in subse-
quent visits. By “identifying” their users, servers are capable of offering personalized
services. The same strategy is applied by an ad exchange when serving ads to users,
in order to recognize them on a later auction. When a new auction is to be held,
an ad exchange sends (ad call) the identifier it keeps about the user to the prospec-
tive bidders (advertisers). Such an identifier (cookie) allows advertisers (or their
corresponding DSPs) to find any other cookie left on the user’s browser in previous
auctions. Moreover, an advertiser by itself might have placed cookies on the user’s
browser from a process unrelated to auctions [11]. Cookies coupled with auction
processes may enable advertisers (and other entities) to build profiles of users with
information about their browsing history and buying habits.
The process of CM, also called cookie syncing, allows an advertiser and an ad
exchange to match the identifiers (cookies) they have about a single user, so that
they can share information about them. As stated above, such information enables
advertisers to make a more informed decision on whether and how much to bid for
an ad impression. A detailed description of how CM works in Google’s ad exchange
DoubleClick can be found in [41].
Real-Time Bidding
Bidding, in general, has represented a breakthrough for the online advertising busi-
ness. Bidding initially arose for paid-search advertising [42], with the aim of giving
transparency to the process of ranking advertisers on search engine results pages.
After spamming had affected the quality of search results provided by search engine
marketing, and after having realized that such a system prevented smaller companies
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from participating in the emerging online advertising system, auctions appeared as a
mechanism to “democratize” the access to the ad-serving ecosystem [11].
RTB, also called programmatic buying, is an auction-based technology for online
advertising. RTB mimics a stock exchange to enable automatic buying and selling of
ads [25]. This automatization allows RTB to perform a per-impression bidding just in
the moment such an impression is generated. Classic bidding used to take place way
before the user accessed the web page where an ad was displayed. Modern bidding,
however, is perceived as a real-time process since ad serving is conducted in a fraction
of second [43].
RTB enables advertisers to bid for the chance to display an ad on a web page
loaded by a user’s browser. After such a process, a publisher shows the ad of the
advertiser that won the bid. When a user spawns a request from their browser to
a website engaged with an ad exchange, a corresponding ad call is generated to the
ad exchange. Upon receiving the ad call (asking for advertising), the ad exchange
sends a bid request to the advertisers that might be interested in sending ads to a
user. Along with the bid request, ad exchanges send valuable information about the
user whose impression is being auctioned [14]. Cookies are extensively used by ad
exchanges and advertisers to collect and share such information, and thus improve
the accuracy of the ad-targeting process [44]. In fact, the very detailed contextual
information provided through cookie-related technology helps advertisers and DSPs
to make the decision of whether and how much to bid for an impression. After bids
are made, a winner is determined during a real-time auction. In a last step, the ad
exchange notifies the winner advertiser and its ad is served on the website through
the user’s browser. This last step may entail a content-delivery network.
Online Tracking
As users browse the Web, they are monitored by the entities they interact with. This
is possible due to user information leaked in the requests sent to such entities.
These entities involve “first parties,” which are the websites directly visited by
users, and “third parties,” which receive user requests automatically (and inadver-
tently) triggered from the user’s browser. While first parties may be seen as the
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intended receivers of user requests, third parties are usually hidden trackers, such as
ad networks, contacted by users as a result of code embedded on most web pages.
Since third parties may be coupled with several web sites, they could receive
interactions of the same user in multiple contexts, e.g., when visiting different web
sites. Besides, the information of the first-party site is released to the third party in
the “referer” header, but other, more sensitive, information could also be released.
Accordingly, third parties could build user browsing histories if supported by other
tracking technologies such as cookies or CM to individuate users.
In a nutshell, online tracking consists in “following” users along the Web, i.e.,
basically knowing when, from where, and what users visit. This is done by triggering
automatic connections from users to third parties when they visit a publisher. Need-
less to say, such connections carry several information items about users, which allow
external entities to become potential trackers.
2.5 Privacy Issues
Several privacy concerns arise from the complex infrastructure developed to support
online advertising. Undoubtedly, the massive collection of user data and its potential
misuse by third parties is one of the most critical.
However, massive collection is motivated by the great utility that can be extracted
currently from big data. In the case of online advertising, data exploitation for dis-
tributing personalized ads supports a billionaire business where even small companies
can participate.
The advertising ecosystem is then crowded with thousands of third-party entities
avid of exploiting personal data for profit. Such amount of potential privacy attackers
is hard to be controlled, even more if the asset to be protected (information) is the
raw material of a business that is said to be supporting the current free-content
distribution model on the Internet.
This whole ecosystem grows exponentially together with the Web, mainly as a
result of an increased online access rate of the world population. That growth, as
well as the need to meet stricter real-time application requirements, has given rise
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to a very complex infrastructure. Such complexity has left little interest in facing
privacy risks.
Finally, despite the recent regulatory efforts for personal data protection, the
strong economic interests behind online advertising keep hindering the effective im-
plementation of privacy protection initiatives. For instance, a series of “dark patterns”
are being adopted by publishers and third parties to circumvent their transparency
and consent management obligations.
Next chapter addresses more deeply these privacy issues.
2.5.1 Privacy Protection Approaches
In general, the concerns regarding privacy arise from the inappropriate collection,
use and sharing of user data [13]. In the context of online advertising, said misuse
of user data is potentially present in different moments in time. First, powerful
tracking mechanisms are employed by high-level advertising players to “follow” users
through the Web [40,45,46]. These tracking mechanisms include cookie matching and
fingerprinting whose implications will be analyzed in the next chapter. When users
navigate a website serving ads, third-party interactions from the browser disclose
user data to said players, which aggregate and store this information (collection).
Then, they process this user data (use) and further distribute it (sharing) to enable
personalization for users and to guide the targeting strategy of advertisers.
Within this framework, external control over the flow of data could only be en-
forced before the collection step, i.e., when the web browser leaks data in third-party
interactions. Further adjustments require changing the online advertising structure.
This is why most of the functional solutions to protect privacy in this domain build on
managing (essentially detecting and blocking) third-party connections from the user
side. These are local approaches, commonly implemented as web browser extensions,
that provide users with tracking blocking capabilities. The most popular ad blocker
is AdBlock Plus [47], but other similar tools exist that also provide transparency and
user personalization [48–50]. In this line, other initiatives propose blocking strategies
implemented in brokers [51] [52] [53] that act as local proxies to filter the interactions
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performed between a group of local users and advertising entities on the Web. His-
torically, these approaches have detected third-party tracking through static blocking
lists that have become extremely long and hard to manage [54], but recent proposals
have improved such detection by using machine-learning techniques [55].
However, ad blockers and anti-trackers suffer from controversial shortcomings.
First, its extended use is seriously threatening the business model of the whole In-
ternet. Also, though radical and apparently infallible, ad blocking would have been
circumvented by tracking companies by exploiting web sockets [56]. Namely, ad
blockers might not be as effective as expected.
Looking for more advertising-friendly solutions to preserve privacy, multiple ini-
tiatives have emerged from the academic world. Those mostly suggest integrating
the active participation of users so they can decide how to manage their data. Some
of these works [51] propose incorporating trusted third-parties to intermediate the
communication between users and advertising players to encrypt or obfuscate user
data. Several other approaches present advertising architectures where the exploita-
tion and sharing of data is moved to the user premises, i.e., to the user’s browser or a
local application [52,57,58]. This enables users to control how their data is processed
and how and when it is shared to third-parties. Two recent research works [59, 60]
present protocols to exploit personal data while auctioning user impressions without
revealing any personal preferences (in clear text) to advertising parties. As some of
the previous approaches, these protocols require that user information be processed
locally in the browser, and that a trusted third-party assist in performing operations
over encrypted user data.
Other more revolutionary proposals even suggest adapting the advertising model
to allow users to be rewarded for ceding their data [61, 62] or to enable advertising
players to charge users for not tracking them [63]. Sadly, all this related academic
research requires modifying the current online advertising model, either in the way
user data is exploited or in the mechanism to obtain (economic) value from it. These
are important changes that would significantly impact the utility of the user infor-
mation received by ad platforms, thus negatively affecting their huge revenues. As a
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consequence, there might not be incentives for the advertising market to adopt them
in the short-medium term.
With blocking solutions that are critically tampering with the economy of the
Web [64] and academic approaches that are not feasible in the short term, it seems
that we need to look beyond to get real privacy. Reaching effective strategies implies
starting to disrupt the core of the ecosystem in order to address the moments when
user data is processed and shared. Some steps in that line are already taking place
thanks to strict privacy regulation recently promulgated [65] in Europe that is moti-
vating companies to cooperate in favor of the privacy of users. Interestingly, the mere
application of transparency initiatives has already allowed to unveil further privacy
risks within advertising platforms [66,67].
Chapter 3
Privacy Threats and Protection
Approaches in Online Advertising
3.1 Introduction
In Sec. 2.5, we commented that the pervasive dissemination of online advertising on
the Internet and the prevailing need of ad platforms and other intermediary entities
to collect a wealth of data about Web users prompt serious concerns regarding user
privacy [68, 69]. In fact, much of the concern regarding privacy and thus regard-
ing privacy threats in online advertising are derived from the risks of misuse of this
huge amount of user data, which is held by advertising platforms. Said misuse of
user information might include common privacy issues such as data leakage, unau-
thorized collection of data, and sharing with a third-party. Interestingly, as surveyed
in Sec. 2.3, the structure of ad platforms and the abilities of their players reflect
behaviors strictly coincidental with such privacy issues.
In accordance with the above reflection, in this chapter, we first identify the
privacy threats specifically inherent to, or arising as a result of, online advertising,
based on a characterization of the main players as potential attackers, and of the
effects of their capabilities as primary threats. Note that, although the concept of
privacy is intimately related to that of information security, the former is addressed
here as a particular field of the latter, whose focus is on protecting user data from
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being revealed, without consent, to potential attackers. Thus, the scenarios in which
the user information leaks could be classified as risky.
The privacy risks posed by the tracking and profiling practices of the online ad-
vertising industry have motivated a variety of privacy-protecting approaches from
academia. These research initiatives mostly rely on mechanisms that may support or
complement the current economic model of the Web, while others suggest moderate
blocking of third-party tracking(a) to protect user privacy. Other plug-and-play pro-
posals are also available to users and are supported commercially. In essence, such
approaches provide users with transparency and control functionalities over their
browsing data, yet putting at risk the Web economic model, currently built on the
revenues of online advertising, through radical blocking mechanisms.
In this chapter, we address the main parameters that characterize the current pri-
vacy protection approaches in online advertising, in particular, their location, scope
of application and strategy. Afterwards, we analyze the most relevant research work
and industry proposals which tackle the problem of privacy protection in online ad-
vertising.
This analysis exclude the specific context involving mobile devices, albeit much
of the following reasoning might still be true for both desktop-based and mobile
browsing. Certainly, advertising in mobile communication environments, deserve a
separate study, given the complexity of their infrastructures and the growing use of
smartphones connected to Internet.
In the next paragraphs we provide more detail regarding the objectives of this
chapter.
• This chapter presents a “big picture” of the state-of-the-art of academic and
industry solutions designed to protect web users from privacy threats posed
by the online advertising ecosystem. This is done by characterizing the main
actors of this infrastructure, the interactions among them, and their supporting
technologies. Said introduction provides with the necessary depth to understand
the intricate dynamics of the current advertising ecosystem, and the privacy
risks users are exposed to.
(a)The vast majority of ads today are served by third-party entities [2, 70].
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• To shed some light over these risks, we conduct a thorough analysis of the capa-
bilities of the components involved in the ad-delivery process, in terms of type
and scope of data collection, aggregation level, and, accordingly, privacy threat.
This allows the definition of an adversary model and a systematic classification
of the elements of the online advertising architecture.
• In addition we perform a comprehensive overview of the protection mechanisms
that may cope with such threats. These mechanisms are examined, among
other aspects, on the basis of the location of the mechanism employed, the
scope of its application and its protection strategy. First we concentrate on
privacy mechanisms that operate on the user side, since the opacity of online
ad platforms has not allowed further research inside. This review establishes
a correspondence between the privacy risks identified in the first part of this
chapter and the proposals, both from academia and industry, that may address
them.
By systematizing the analysis of privacy risks and protection mechanisms, this
chapter aims at providing privacy designers and researchers with a far-reaching picture
of the current state of affairs in online advertising.
The work presented in this chapter was published in [17].
Chapter outline
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 examines the privacy risks
inherent to the scenario of the online advertising ecosystem. Section 3.3 conducts a
thorough analysis of the most relevant mechanisms to mitigate such risks. In Sec. 3.4,
we discuss the various threats identified and the mechanisms that may address them.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Sec. 3.5.
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3.2 Privacy Threats in Online Advertising
3.2.1 Attacker Model
Privacy criteria are commonly defined in terms of the amount and quality of in-
formation that potential attackers might be able to collect about users. Further,
characterizing such potential attackers is of special relevance since user privacy is
generally measured with respect to the adversary’s capabilities as in [71].
Should we consider any entity with access to user data as a privacy attacker, the
modern online ecosystem is nowadays plagued by potential adversaries. In the context
we address, such adversaries are the multiple intermediate entities developed as part of
the online advertising architecture. Although most of these prospective attackers are
not directly involved in the raw web traffic spawned by a user, a variety of contextual
user information is leaked to ad-serving entities [72] [57]. In general, the information
typically collected about a user includes their clickstream, browsing history, shopping
habits, preference ratings, entertainment preferences, location, gender, age, and agent
string [46].
The online applications and devices (such as browsers and computers) that are
daily employed by users lend themselves to the generation of a sort of digital signature
that can be subject to fingerprinting. This signature is built with a chain of pieces
of information (software installed, plug-ins, and version of applications) that almost
uniquely identify a user on the Web. No matter if a user deletes their cookies, she can
be tracked online through such a string of data, commonly called an agent string [46].
Even though these items of information might not seem relevant to the identity
of a user, several studies have shown that data on some of these “tags” might be
sufficient to unambiguously identify a user within a country [73] [74].
Potential attackers in the online advertising ecosystem could be classified as first
and third parties, according to the interaction level of each entity with the user. A
first party is directly (consciously) contacted by a user. Nevertheless, third parties are
contacted through requests that are not explicitly triggered by users. In this context,
publishers may be regarded as the only first-party entities, since the interaction with
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them is directly made by users; the rest of the components of the advertising architec-
ture depicted in Fig. 2.3 may be considered as “third-party adversaries”. Naturally,
the scope of all these potential privacy attackers will vary from local to global accord-
ing to the amount of users whose information is traded through every component. Of
course, such hierarchical scope will determine the aggregation ability and, therefore,
the level of privacy risk posed by each of these components.
Publishers can be considered first-party potential attackers within the online
advertising ecosystem. Attracting users to its web pages, a publisher receives direct
requests from them. From such requests, some items of user information can be
immediately inferred such as location and agent string. Depending on the type of
publisher (news, shopping, social network, rating, etc.), certain information about the
user such as gender, age, shopping habits or preference ratings may also be collected.
The tracking mechanisms used by publishers are supported on their web log files and
first-party cookies.
Advertisers become third-party adversaries since they receive information about
users from subtle requests that derive from a user’s page visits. Browsing history,
location, gender, shopping habits, and other basic contextual data is typically leaked
by the online advertising infrastructure so that advertisers can decide whether to
bid or not for a given user impression. However, since the described interaction is
currently subcontracted to aggregating entities like DSPs and ad networks, the ability
of advertisers to directly access user information is significantly diminished.
The ability of DSPs to aggregate user information make these intermediaries very
powerful potential adversaries to user privacy. Working for thousands of advertisers,
a DSP is responsible for selecting the best impressions to bid on. This bidding process
is carried out on the basis of both users’ metadata and advertisers’ specific campaign
requirements. Users’ contextual data are included in billions of bid requests sent by
dozens of associated ad exchanges. Hence, it is difficult to imagine the amount of user
information that DSPs are fed with, even without winning auctions. In fact, although
ad exchanges recommend not to misuse the contextual information contained in such
bid requests, a massive surveillance engine could be deployed through a group of
colluding DSPs.
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SSPs are the primary source of user information in the current automatic adver-
tising architecture. Helping thousands of publishers interact with other intermediaries
such as ad exchanges, SSPs make an offer of an ad space to at least one ad exchange
when a user triggers an impression. To give context to such an offer, it is sent along
with user data that SSPs gather from different sources. These data may include
the visited website, cookies, and browsing information. Thus, SSPs consolidate huge
amounts of user data, which raises serious privacy concerns, especially when much of
this information comes directly from publishers. From a user’s perspective, DSPs and
SSPs are third-party adversaries, as they are fed with private, sensitive information
that does not come directly from users.
Acting as gateways between buyers (DSPs) and sellers (SSPs), ad exchanges
are one of the strongest third-party adversaries in our privacy attacker model. These
higher-level entities consolidate ad spaces offered by multiple publishers (SSPs) and
organize automatic auctions to sell such spaces to advertisers (DSPs). With that
objective, ad exchanges concentrate most of the online advertising traffic and the
user information used as input to effectively distribute ads. But not only that, ad
exchanges also massively distribute such user data to multiple advertisers (mainly
DSPs) so that the latter can make their bidding decisions. Given such capabilities
of consolidating and indiscriminately distributing user information, ad exchanges are
clearly the most powerful privacy attackers of the online advertising ecosystem.
Finally, although they are not strictly part of the online advertising architecture,
broadband providers are unsurprisingly part of the attacker model we have de-
scribed. Offering the transport channel that connects every user with the Web, these
network-layer intermediaries have privileged access to user information, including that
of ad related interactions. Table 3.1 consolidates the key details of these elements
that make up the adversary model in the online advertising ecosystem.
3.2.2 Classification of Privacy Threats and User Role
Having specified the adversary model assumed for online advertising, which we de-
scribed on the basis of the different intermediary entities involved in the ad-delivery
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every single trace of user interactions
with the Web
Global High High
Table 3.1: Components of our adversary model in the scenario of online advertising.
process, next we proceed to classify the corresponding privacy threats based on the
capabilities of such entities, but also in terms of the limitations of users.
Platform Intrinsic Leaks
The main cause of privacy threats in online advertising is tightly coupled with the
infrastructure and capabilities of ad platforms. To start, within this infrastructure,
every tracking mechanism is enabled by default; there is not a built-in option for
users to disable tracking or ad serving. Additionally, as depicted in Sec. 2.3, this
infrastructure is significantly crowded with intermediate entities directly or indirectly
fed with user data. Also, it is evident that the business model of online advertising,
and so its infrastructure, builds on the collection of as much information about users
as possible.
Regarding their capabilities, online advertising platforms carry out practices that
support advanced levels of user targeting while neglecting privacy and even supporting
the leak of personal data. In this subsection, we briefly examine such practices, which
are mainly based on user tracking [57, 75]. Based on the interaction among users
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characteristics of user applications and devices
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language
Table 3.2: Summary of the privacy threats examined in our analysis.
and privacy attackers, tracking mechanisms can be classified into first and third-
party mechanisms. As we see next, these mostly employ cookies to individuate users.
Table 3.2 summarizes these threats.
T1. First-Party Tracking encompasses the activities performed by first-party
adversaries, mainly publishers, to collect and analyze user information. Such activities
include serving (first-party) cookies directly by the publisher to its users and mining
the firsthand information, mainly location and agent string, provided by them in
their web requests. Depending on the publisher’s interaction level with its users,
very valuable personal information could be directly gathered by publishers, e.g.,
gender, ratings, social interactions, preferences, shopping habits, health condition.
Since the interactions leaking this information are explicitly triggered by the user,
they are unlikely to be cataloged as malicious. Thus, detecting or blocking first-party
tracking is just as complex, yet the scope of first-party tracking (and thus its privacy
risks) is limited due to the size of the publisher’s audience. Though, some publishers
might collude with aggregating entities such as ad exchanges to provide them with
aggregated user information [76].
T2. Third-Party Tracking builds on indirect, and likely non-consented, inter-
actions between intermediate advertising entities (DSPs, SSPs, ad exchanges) and
users. Such interactions are generated by content embedded in first-party sites from
which user information is also leaked to third parties. The wider scope and higher
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hierarchy of entities performing third-party tracking for digital advertising facilitate
massive aggregation of personal information. However, third party tracking is not
only deployed through cookies, but also by means of social plug-ins that may also
disclose user browsing information to social networks [77]. Mechanisms aimed at
protecting users from privacy risks of online advertising commonly block third-party
connections after classifying them as undesired [78].
T3. Cookie Matching is a technology that supports the sharing of user data.
Served both by first and third-party adversaries, cookies are the basic tracking tech-
nology used in online advertising. Within online advertising, cookies have given rise
to concerns about the privacy of users for two main reasons. First, cookies are cur-
rently being used to store personal information such as e-mail addresses, not only
identifiers to recognize a user in future visits [45]. Secondly, they enable massive
sharing of such personal data through a more refined tracking technology, CM. CM
enables an ad exchange to share users’ cookie information with multiple potential
advertisers so that they can infer contextual user data by mapping their own cookies
(obtained from previous interactions with a user) with the ones obtained from the ad
exchange [44].
Experiments done by Bashir et al. in [76] report about the ubiquity of CM on
today’s Web and on how shared information supports highly targeted advertising.
It is worth noting that, although using cookies is an old practice originally built
upon pretty small pieces of identifying information, they have significantly evolved to
become large capacity structures, very popular tracking mechanisms, and increasingly
more difficult to delete, as illustrated in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Accordingly, a great deal
of recent research has been done regarding online tracking [79–81], studied in desktop
browsing contexts where the most evolved forms of cookies [82, 83] are subject to
analysis.
T4. Fingerprinting, not built on cookies, is also available to support personal-
ized online advertising. It consists in detecting the agent string of users’ devices or
applications. Thus, no matter if a user deletes her cookies, he can always be tracked
online through such an agent string [46]. As a matter of fact, some variations of fin-
gerprinting are commonly used to respawn cookies after a user deleted them. Mayer
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Table 3.4: Tracking mechanisms used in modern online advertising.
and Mitchel synthesize in [40] a list of non-cookie web tracking technologies used both
from first and third-party entities.
T5. Flash Cookies [82] pose an alternative tracking technology for advertising
entities trying to face the advent of mechanisms to block traditional tracking. Flash
cookies are more effective in tracking users than common HTTP cookies. In fact,
Flash cookies are considered prominently intrusive due to their persistence charac-
teristics (more storage capacity, browser independent storage, and non-default expi-
ration) [82–84]. After online advertisers were accused of misusing Flash cookies (by
enabling restoring of deleted HTTP cookies), a study by McDonald and Cranor [85]
found that the practice of respawning erased cookies had become significantly less
aggressive.
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T6. Canvas Fingerprinting is another persistent web tracking technology cur-
rently used by some online advertising agents, especially data aggregators [86]. Canvas
fingerprinting facilitates tracking by generating a fingerprint of a user’s browser from
an HTML 5 Canvas element [79]. Such an element might be used by an (first or third-
party) adversary to dynamically display, even invisible, text or images in the user’s
browser. Since the rendering of the Canvas element will slightly vary depending on
the web browser’s image processing resources, such particular displaying parameters
could be used to get a fingerprint that might uniquely identify a user surfing a web
page; to do it, certain browser properties are collected such as the list of installed
plug-ins [46]. A few first and third-party providers of Canvas fingerprinting have been
found from previous studies [79] and the tracking mechanism can be blocked if the
provider’s domain is known.
T7. HTML5 Local Storage is an even more persistent cookie-based tracking
technology, developed as part of the HTML5 web language. Local storage enables
more universal user tracking [87] that does not depend on the browser used, does
not expire, and offers even more storage capacity, by default, than HTTP and Flash
cookies (see Table 3.3). Such a feature might let some first or third parties store data
(within the user’s browser) that cannot be deleted when erasing browser’s cookies.
However, such intrusive tracking mechanisms might be aggressively tackled with law-
suits, especially when accomplished by advertisers, as Wired reported in 2010 [88].
Said misusing of cookies was reported by Hoofnagle et al. in 2012 [87] when they
found that some companies had been using HTML5 and Flash cookies to respawn
HTTP cookies that had been previously deleted by users. In Table 3.4 we summarize
some of the characteristics of these tracking mechanisms including their effectiveness
in individuating users, and whether the companies using them have faced lawsuits
due to the intrusiveness of these mechanisms.
Other intrinsic properties of ad platforms make them pretty susceptible to pri-
vacy leaks. For example, the subtlety of their background processes isolates users in
a separate dimension where they are unaware of the implicit risks. In addition, as
recently reported in [45], relevant user information might be being conveyed in the
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clear text during real-time auctions. In the same line, [14] and [76] reported cooper-
ation between relevant entities such as ad exchanges and publishers, and quantified
the derived leakage of users’ browsing information. On a last note, chances are that
the context information that feeds auctions will reach entities not really involved in
bidding processes (or deliberately bidding to lose). Should ad platforms cannot detect
such behavior, a cheap massive surveillance tool could be built on top of advertising
infrastructures. This phenomenon is experimentally addressed later in Chapter 5.
User Role Limitations
User capabilities are, by default, pretty limited online. Although their interactions
fuel ad delivery services, users are unaware of the transactions that are made in the
background when they are served an ad, which also reduces their chances to protect
themselves. This blindness and lack of control of users is the source of important
privacy threats, especially in online advertising systems, where ad services are inherent
to web browsing.
L1. Lack of awareness. Historically, online privacy has been a concern for users,
as reflected in [89]. However, as explained by Ackerman et al., when faced with an
abstract context where the leakage of personal information is not evident (as it might
be within social networks), users’ concerns get significantly lightened. This attitude of
users towards privacy, particularly in advertising environments, is illustrated in [90],
which reports that users are more concerned about being shown embarrassing ads
than about being tracked.
In accordance with said lack of awareness, users hardly notice the relative value
of their data within commercial contexts. Evidence on the dichotomy on how users
and ad services value user data is offered in [91] and [14], respectively.
L2. Lack of control. In the opaque scenario of online advertising, users cannot
protect their privacy adequately. Neither their interests nor concerns can be enforced
because users are, by default, passive entities in the advertising ecosystem.
L3. Bounded technical knowledge. Users face an important cognitive barrier
that seriously limits their capabilities to manage their protection against privacy
threats in online advertising. Even being aware of the risks posed in this context,
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and having the control to at least mitigate some of them, most users do not have the
technical knowledge to understand the logic of protecting themselves within such a
complex scenario.
Consequently, in online advertising contexts — unlike what happens in other on-
line scenarios —, leaks of user data are not driven by user explicit flaws but arise
from the complex structure and operation of the ad-serving process. Ironically, on-
line advertising was said to offer users more control over advertising exposure than
traditional advertising [92]. Table 3.5 summarizes the user role limitations that ex-
acerbate user privacy risks in the context of online advertising.
3.2.3 Impact of Online Advertising Practices on Privacy
Since ad personalization (e.g., based on location, context and interests) increases
conversion rates, users’ browsing data have inevitably become an asset that nowadays
is exchanged throughout the entire online advertising infrastructure [45]. The need to
further scrutinize this information to profile and segment users raises serious privacy
concerns with respect to social sorting and discrimination, particularly as potentially
sensitive information can be inferred from the profile of a reidentified user, such as
income level, health issues or political preferences.
Modern auction-based ad delivery requires that processes be executed in real-time,
which implies that vast amounts of user information be mined at very high rates. This
urgent need might naturally discourage the online actors from protecting user infor-
mation against privacy attacks. Besides the urgency in which data must be handled,
the need to offer tailored ads compels the advertising ecosystem to collect a wide
range of metadata. For this reason, practices such as cooperation (collusion) among
advertising entities and aggregation are enabled to facilitate massive and often uncon-
trolled sharing of said information [44]. Since the shared data (sometimes including
even the prices paid by advertisers) are not always encrypted, other adversaries, such
as Internet providers, come into the picture.
As described in previous sections, online advertising builds on non-transparent
interactions among a myriad of intermediary ad companies, which have the ability to
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Code User role limitations Brief description
L1 Lack of awareness
the leakage of personal information is not evident for users in
online advertising
L2 Lack of control
user preferences and concerns are not technically enforced by
default in online advertising
L3 Bounded technical knowledge
users barely have the technical knowledge to understand and
effectively use protection tools
Table 3.5: Summary of the user role limitations examined in our analysis.
profile web users. As a result, not even publishers are aware of which information is
collected and how it is used. In fact, publishers are unaware of what ads are shown to
their visiting users. The ad-delivery process involves so many intermediary companies
that it is impossible for an ad exchange to control the use of user data by such compa-
nies. In fact, cases are known where attackers took advantage of advertising channels
to distribute malicious code to millions of users [6]. This lack of transparency obvi-
ously prevents users from actively getting involved in the protection of their privacy.
Though there are informed users who use transparency and protection tools while
browsing, advanced mechanisms are currently implemented by the online advertising
ecosystem to counteract cookie removal or ad blocking.
Finally, due to the auction-based policies of the advertising ecosystem, certain
users invariably become more economically valuable than others. For example, Ole-
jnik et al. found in [14] that, in terms of prices paid during online auctions, visitors
of websites belonging to particular categories are much more relevant than visitors
of websites of other categories. Yet, other criteria such as the user location and time
of visit might also be used to determine the relevance of the corresponding profiles.
Such more relevant users stand out from the rest and gradually their profiles become
more identifiable and, as a result, less private. Unfortunately, evidence has been
found suggesting that negative discrimination (such as racism) might be performed
in online ad delivery [93].
3.3 Privacy Protection Approaches
In this section we perform a deep analysis of the privacy protection approaches avail-
able for users in the context of online advertising. For the sake of comparability, we
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IV. Mechanisms for Privacy En-























Figure 3.1: List of privacy mechanisms, specifically intended for online advertising, that we examine
in Sec. 3.3.
first define the protection parameters based on which each mechanism, tool, or tech-
nology is described. Moreover, we classify them as academic or commercial initiatives
since many of them have been implemented and are very popular among users. For
illustration, the full list is of these approaches is presented in Fig. 3.1.
42
CHAPTER 3. PRIVACY THREATS AND PROTECTION APPROACHES IN ONLINE
ADVERTISING
3.3.1 Protection Parameters
Our analysis of privacy protection mechanisms examines three main characteristics
of their operation: location, scope, and strategy. Below we proceed to describe them.
Location
According to the location where the protection mechanism takes place, the current
research proposals and commercial solutions can be classified roughly into local and
third-party. On the one hand, local mechanisms commonly lie on the user side, for
example, in the form of an application running on the user’s browser, or as a local
service operating in the user’s network [53]. Some academic approaches propose
migrating the profiling processes required for ad targeting to the user side [57]. On
the other hand, third-party mechanisms are implemented with the help of a broker
entity, whose location is remote from the user side, and whose aim is commonly
to provide security services such as secure storage of data, anonymization and even
user profiling [51]. We would like to stress that, even in the case of broker-based
mechanisms, a local application on the user side is frequently required to engage
users with said broker.
Scope
Depending on the scope of application of the mechanism in question, we may charac-
terize it as local or global. Protection approaches whose scope is local usually aim at
adapting a protection mechanism to the structure of the current advertising ecosys-
tem. Hence, the scope of protection offered is also limited to the information and
interactions available to the user. On the other hand, those protection approaches
with a global scope come in hand with new ad delivery models, pretending to radically
change the manner in which ad serving processes currently function, especially with
regard to their relationship with users. The majority of these approaches has been
envisioned as privacy-by-design models of advertising which would provide users with
significant control over their interactions with ad platforms.
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Strategy
In our classification of privacy technologies, we also consider the principle or strategy
that rely on. We contemplate five strategies which range from user lack of aware-
ness through transparency, to undesired interactions with third-parties by means of
blocking, obfuscation, and sandboxing, and to a by-default exclusion of users from
the advertising logic through more inclusive techniques. Next, we describe these
strategies.
Transparency: Undoubtedly, a first step towards privacy protection may be
transparency. Transparency in this context means allowing users to learn what is
going on with regard to their activity and data in online advertising systems. Some
of the approaches examined in the coming subsections provide transparency usually
by making users aware of the tracking activities behind the scenes, and by allowing
them to know how their browsing traces might have been exploited to deliver targeted
ads.
Blocking: Blocking is also a very common, although usually radical, strategy of
privacy protection in online advertising [78]. Typically, blocking tools inhibit most
of the known tracking mechanisms (and thus of advertising) from the user side, or a
third-party located on their network. Because the vast majority of ads are delivered
nowadays through third-party trackers, cutting of third-party tracking implies elimi-
nating nearly all ads. Originally, blocking mechanisms had been designed as a binary
choice, namely, either blocking or allowing all tracking and hence advertising. Never-
theless, recent academic proposals tend to lighten this radical strategy by providing
fine-grained control over tracking, by enforcing users’ preferences and by using smart
and dynamic learning mechanisms [94] [95].
Obfuscation: It consists in perturbing sensitive data in order to preclude an
adversary from discovering the identity of its owner and/or deriving private informa-
tion about them [96]. In the context of online advertising, some privacy protection
approaches implement obfuscation by mixing data and metadata of a group of user
profiles so that the intrinsic features of individual profiles cannot be recognized. Other
approaches build on external brokers to anonymize user data by randomly masking
potentially identifying attributes such as IP addresses and cookies.
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Protection mech. Location Scope
Protection strategy



















RePriv local local 3 3 3
Privacy Badger local local 3 3 3
MyTrackingChoices local local 3 3 3
MyAdChoices local local 3 3 3
AdReveal local local 3
XRay local local 3
Table 3.6: Academic proposals for privacy enhancement in online advertising classified on the basis
of the protection parameters described in Sec. 3.3.2.
Sandboxing: Sandboxing addresses security threats by isolating suspicious ap-
plications from the resources they rely on. Within online advertising, sandboxing is
applied by keeping apart certain critical processes which may give advertising bro-
kers access to sensitive user data. A typical sandboxing example leverages on the
execution user profiling on the premises of the user, rather than on the ad-platform
side [52,57,58].
User Inclusion: With the aim of balancing the Internet’s dominant business
model and user privacy, some proposals envision a more user-driven ecosystem. In
general, giving users more control over their interactions with ad platforms might
help achieve said balance. A practical step towards this consists in adapting the
protection mechanisms to the needs of users. In this line, most ad blocking solutions
have recently started to offer users some personalization features such as blocking
per domain and per tracker. Other strategies include the enforcement of user choices
over third-party, cookie-based tracking, and the provision of direct interfaces with the
advertising ecosystem [58,97].
3.3.2 Academic Initiatives
This section examines in depth the most relevant approaches in the academic litera-
ture of privacy-enhancing technologies for online advertising. Table 3.6 provides an
overview of the technologies explored in this section.
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ObliviAd
Proposed by Backes et al. [51], ObliviAd relies on adapting secure-coprocessor-based
brokers to the current online advertising ecosystem. The aim of such coprocessors is
providing private information retrieval of user data during the delivery of ads to users
and the billing to advertisers. To do so, this approach provides different services such
as the secure storage of sensitive user data, the encryption of profile information when
it is conveyed to the broker side, the encryption of ad information to be displayed on
the user side, and finally the obfuscation of billing data to charge advertisers.
While all these services that integrate ObliviAd may offer strong security guar-
antees through hardware and heavy cryptographic techniques, this is undoubtedly at
the cost of a significant increase in complexity and deployment. It is worth stressing
as well that network and browser identifiers such as the user’s IP address and user
agents might still leak, which means that this approach might not be useful against
the fingerprinting techniques described in Sec. 3.2.2.
AdJail
Ter Louw et al. [98] proposes a tool that aims at empowering publishers to isolate the
content elements to which ads will have access to. Specifically, this approach allows
safeguarding a user’s scope and that of the web application by creating a sandbox
where ads are executed. From this sandbox, ads may have access to user or publisher
content through a configurable set of enforcing policies. Although the aim of AdJail is
to protect the confidentiality and integrity of user and publisher data, user privacy can
also be provided by applying those policies based on the privacy agreement negotiated
between publishers and their users.
The problem of AdJail, however, is that its scope is limited to the publisher’s
domain. In other words, users can utilize this sandboxing approach only if this mech-
anism is deployed in the website. In addition, AdJail focuses more on other security
services such as integrity and confidentiality, and does not tackle the privacy threats
identified in Sec. 3.2. Since AdJail’s scope focuses on the publisher, we categorize
this proposal neither as local nor as global.
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Privad
S. Guha et al. [52] seeks a more private online advertising system and offers to this end
an alternative private solution that may adapt seamlessly to the current advertising
business model. The authors argue that Privad, their solution, would preserve privacy
by keeping a user’s browsing profile within a local user application. Nonetheless, they
also claim that some information (related to the user’s interests and to the ads they
have viewed or clicked) “necessarily” would have to leave the user’s domain.
Privad also incorporates a third-party anonymizing proxy. This proxy would re-
ceive the released (and ciphered) user information and, after hiding the user network
address, it would deliver this information to an ad platform. Advertisers aiming at
delivering ads feed the ad platform with their ads, including information of the pro-
file to which each ad is targeted; and then this information is employed by the ad
platform to tailor ads to those profiles. Consequently, this approach uses the proxy
to anonymize user information so that the ad platform in question is not able to
individuate a user from the preferences reports generated by his browsing activity.
Unfortunately, anonymizing strategies like this have proved to be weak [74], especially
when demographic information about users is still available for a potential attacker,
and when such information is managed by a third-party entity over which a user
might not have any control (such as an Internet service provider).
Adnostic
It is an academic proposal by Toubiana et al. [99] that implements a more friendly
architecture to display personalized advertising without compromising user privacy.
Such architecture does not rely on blocking ads but on performing the whole user
profiling process within the user domain, so that no personal information is leaked
out to third parties.
The ads to be shown to a user are chosen on their side, according to a locally
estimated browsing profile. This profile is constructed by processing the user’s queries
and the content of visited pages. Then, this information is classified within the
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browser by means of natural language processing techniques. The ads, which are
part of a previously downloaded set, are displayed according to the user’s interests.
Because personalization is not directly controlled by ad platforms, there are less
incentives for advertisers to bid more money to place ads. However, we may expect
worse personalization performance since this process takes place on the user side,
based only on their browsing data. This is in contrast to the current ad-targeting
algorithms implemented by ad platforms which rely on massive amounts of aggregated
user data.
In terms of impact on the current infrastructure, on the other hand, Adnostic
would eliminate the requirement of intermediary ad platforms, but unfortunately at
the expense of less effective ad-targeting. As a matter of fact, the more components
of the online advertising architecture are embedded on the user side, the more control
the user may have over advertising. Obviously, this would mitigate many of the
privacy risks analyzed in Sec. 3.2.
RePriv
It is a proposal by Fredrikson and Livshits [58] that aims at carrying out a selective
disclosure of user data through a browser-based tool. First, as with the extensions
described above, the proposed system would rely on the ability of the browser to
capture all the information spawned while browsing the Web; this is the basis for local
user profiling. Next, the system contemplates that the interests derived from such
user profile are released to third-parties only if the user gives permission. Detailed
information about their browsing habits, though, would not be released by default.
Finally, the proposed system considers additional modules that would interface with
third-party applications interested in having access to user data.
The privacy-preserving strategy of RePriv consists in profiling users locally, so that
they have control over the information that is disclosed to ad companies. However,
although users are in control of said disclosure, external entities might be collecting
such data anyway. Even though at first RePriv might seem an interesting approach,
its success in protecting user privacy certainly depends on the disclosure control given
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to users. Again, such a control may tend to be absolute (as in ad blockers) or could be
softened to balance the trade-off between user privacy and the web business model.
Privacy Badger
Much of its functionality was incorporated from an older project called ShareMeNot
which was originally presented in [100] by Roesner et al. Currently supported by
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Privacy Badger is an open-source browser
extension developed for Chrome and Firefox [94]. The extension was not conceived
as an ad blocker but as a privacy tool that may prevent non-consented tracking.
The operation of this browser plug-in does not rely on blocking all tracking by
default and on static filtering lists. Instead, it capitalizes on an algorithm to detect
and then prevent non-consensual tracking activities. Since the blocking mechanism is
not based on the subscription to a deliberate filtering list but on rigorous algorithmic
methods and policies, engagements with advertising companies to include blocking
exceptions are in principle less likely to occur.
With regard to its graphical interface, this extension looks very similar to Discon-
nect and Ghostery. The user is shown the tracking companies following their visit to
a page. As mentioned above, this tool does not block a tracker unless its algorithm
checks it is following the user without their consent. Nevertheless, conducting this
checking may take some time. On the other hand, as with most ad blockers, users
may individually block or allow the detected trackers, or block only the correspond-
ing tracking cookies. Additional options include disabling the extension on a per-site
basis and manually adding a whitelisted trackers domain.
Privacy Badger represents a promising approach to balance the trade-off inherent
in online advertising between user privacy and the Web economic model. In fact,
besides blocking non-consensual tracking, its developers offer ad companies the op-
portunity to be whitelisted if they formally promise to respect opt-out mechanisms
(e.g., Do Not Track headers), conforming with users’ privacy policies [94].
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MyTrackingChoices
Achara et al. [97] propose a browser extension available for Google Chrome and
Mozilla Firefox. The plug-in targets users who are not in general against advertising
and accept the trade-off that comes with the ”free” content. However, for privacy
concerns, they wish to exert fine-grained control over tracking.
This academic proposal relies on the assumption that some categories of web
pages (e.g., related to health or religion) are more privacy-sensitive to users than
others (e.g., about education or science). Based on this idea, the plug-in allows users
to specify the categories of web pages that are privacy-sensitive to them and block the
trackers present on such web pages only. As tracking is prevented by blocking network
connections of third-party domains, MyTrackingChoices avoids not only tracking but
also third-party ads.
The detection of the tracking companies does not rely on existing blacklists, unlike
most ad blockers and anti-trackers. Rather, MyTrackingChoices keeps a local list that
is built from the pages browsed by the user. This list is smaller and easier to maintain
than the list of tracking and advertising domains currently used by Adblock Plus. To
decide if a third-party domain is a tracker or not, the tool checks it is present on three
or more different domains that a user visited in the past. Since users continue receiving
ads on those web pages which belong to non-sensitive categories, this approach may
provide a better trade-off between user privacy and the Web economy. However,
this approach only provides privacy protection against previously defined sensitive
content, when tracked through HTML cookies, and thus does not preclude more
sophisticated tracking technologies (such as canvas fingerprinting) and less simple
tracking methods based on IP address.
MyAdChoices
Parra-Arnau et al. [95] propose a web-browser plug-in aimed at bringing transparency
over tracking and advertising, and providing a certain level of granularity with regard
to blocking ads. As for transparency, the plug-in estimates if the ads delivered to a
user may have been generated from their previously visited pages. It also permits
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users to know if the browsing profiles available to trackers and ad companies may
show common or unique interests.
In terms of blocking functionalities, the tool enables users to hide ads by topic
category and depending on whether they have been displayed based on users’ browsing
interests or not. Although the tool provides fine-grained control over ads, it does
not prevent any form of tracking; ads are basically hidden to users by applying a
black mask on top of ad images. Another limitation of this approach is that the
transparency functionalities come at the cost of additional traffic. The reason is due
to the fact that, to decide if an ad is profile based, it must revisit the pages browsed
by the user in incognito mode.
AdReveal
Liu et al. [101] propose an advertising-transparency platform aimed at studying the
ads delivered to some artificial profiles, built from the AOL search query data set [102].
The tool is not intended for end-users, unlike MyAdChoices, and provides a framework
that aims to study interest-based and contextual advertising at large scale. The
platform, which operates offline and is restricted to DoubleClick ads, analyzes two
data sets to this end: the interest categories of all ads received both in a tracked
session and in an incognito-browsing mode. The authors then use a binary classifier
to decide if an ad belonging to a certain category is interest-based or contextual.
XRay
Similarly to AdReveal, XRay [103] propose a transparency platform which tracks
the personal data collected by several Web services, and tries to correlate data inputs
(e.g., e-mails and search queries) with data outputs (e.g., ads and recommended links).
The proposed platform has been tested for the ads displayed on Gmail and relies on
the maintenance of a number of shadow accounts, that is, replicates of the original
account (e.g., an e-mail account), but which differ in a subset of inputs. All these
account instances are operated in parallel by the system and are used to compare the
outputs received. Intuitively, if an ad is displayed more frequently on those accounts
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sharing a certain input (e.g., an e-mail), and this ad never shows up in the rest of
shadow instances, then this input is likely to be the cause of said ad.
The major limitations of transparency tools such as MyAdChoices, AdReveal
and XRay, come from the necessarily simplified model assumed for the ad-delivery
process. Evaluating an ad-transparency tool is, besides, extremely challenging since
the ground truth of targeting decisions is unknown. XRay, in addition, provide a
solution which is not intended for end-users, i.e., it is not designed to be used by a
single user who wishes to find out what particular ads are targeted to them.
3.3.3 Industrial and Commercial Solutions
Commercial solutions mostly take the form of web-browser extensions. Since all user
interactions with the Web are handled through the browser, taking advantage of
such an interface to filter or block third-party tracking seems a reasonable approach.
These browser extensions endeavor to protect user privacy by blocking third-party
interactions. This strategy is usually implemented both statically, based on lists of
banned trackers, or dynamically, based on heuristics and automatic learning. The
specific implemented approach has an immediate, evident effect on the trust level
over the tool and even the performance of the browser. For instance, those tools
based on large blocking lists (such as the ones available for the most popular browser
extensions) may perform worse due to the need to check these lists every time a page
is visited. In this regard, we hasten to stress that the criteria employed to manage
such lists is not clear at all. This obviously may arise suspicion and reduce the level
of trust in these solutions.
A rich variety of browser-based solutions are currently available as commercial
products, some of them providing users with control over online advertising. The
controversy stirred by the use of the blocking lists they rely on [104] [105], however,
has motivated the rise of open-source, transparency technologies that may prevent ad
companies from interfering. Next, we examine a particular class of solutions called
ad blockers. Although there exist numerous tools of this kind, our analysis will focus
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Protection mech. Location Scope
Protection strategy





local local 3 3
Ghostery local local 3 3
Google Sharing third-party local 3 3
Brave N/A global 3 3 3
Subscribe2Web (2) N/A global 3 3
Google
Contributor (2)





local 3 3 3
Table 3.7: Summary of the commercial solutions for privacy protection in online advertising, classi-
fied according to the parameters examined in Sec. 3.3.1.
Extension Blocking strategy Trust level Expected performance
Adblock Plus List-based Medium Low
Ghostery List-based Low Medium
AdBlock List-based Medium Low
Disconnect List-based High High
Lightbeam List-based (items added manually) High Medium
Privacy Badger Heuristic-based/dynamic High Medium
DoNotTrackMe/Blur List-based Medium Medium
MyTrackingChoices Dynamic High High
MyAdChoices Dynamic High High
Brave List-based High High
Table 3.8: Browser-based approaches described in terms of their blocking strategies, trust level and
performance.
only on the most popular ones, namely Adblock Plus and Ghostery. Other ad block-
ers such as AbBlock [106], Lightbeam [107], Disconnect [1], Blur [108], SuperBlock
Adblocker [109], AdRemover [110], AdBlock Pro [111] and uBlock [112] operate sim-
ilarly.
The last group of (four) initiatives explored in this section aim at radically chang-
ing the paradigm of the online ad delivery. Sponsored by relevant institutions such as
Google, Yahoo and Internet providers, these initiatives propose a user-driven archi-
tecture whose main aim is to strike a better trade-off between user privacy and the
Web economic model. Table 3.7 shows a classification of the commercial solutions
analyzed in the coming subsections on the basis of the protection parameters de-
scribed in Sec. 3.3.1. Table 3.8 shows different aspects of the browser-based proposals
(both academic and commercial) such as their strategy to prevent tracking, and the
corresponding trust level and performance.
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Adblock Plus
Available for all major browsers, Adblock Plus is an extension that blocks tracking
and ad serving [47] based on filtering lists which specify the elements of a website
that may be blocked. These elements include malware domains, banners, pop-up
windows, and video ads on Facebook and YouTube. Users enable blocking by adding
the filtering lists of their preference, managed in [54]. Adblock Plus is the world’s
most downloaded ad blocker and therefore the tool that is currently threatening the
Internet business model [113].
This ad blocker has recently incorporated a whitelisting mechanism —enabled by
default— for nonintrusive ads that meet certain criteria. These criteria are defined
in the acceptable ads initiative [114], and although the adherence to this initiative is
optional for advertisers, much criticism has arisen especially after the revelation that
Adblock Plus was getting money from ad companies to whitelist them [115,116].
Ghostery
Developed by Evidon, Ghostery [117] is a proprietary browser add-on capable of de-
tecting third-party trackers. By default, this tool blocks the execution of the tracking
cookies as well as the scripts belonging to the tracking companies that are blacklisted.
The list in question is elaborated by the company itself. Even though the tracking
companies in this list are classified into five categories, according to their different
purposes (analytics, web bugs, privacy, advertising, and widgets), it is highly unlikely
that users recognize such categories or entities to make a conscious configuration of
the tool [118]. However, using such lists may simplify the configuration of the add-on.
When a user browses the Web, Ghostery shows the trackers that are blocked on
each page (through a non-intuitive or usable categorization), and offers the possibil-
ity of adding any such trackers to a whitelist. Ghostery protects users’ privacy from
advertisers by blocking scripts, images, objects, and documents embedded by com-
panies the user might not trust. Other tracking mechanisms such as web or canvas
fingerprinting are not addressed by Ghostery. Finally, the tool has been criticized
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for its default behavior [118] which allows Ghostery to collect information about the
blocked ads, and afterwards sell it to ad companies [119].
Google Sharing
Google Sharing [120] is a system that provides privacy protection by avoiding the
tracking conducted by Google. It consists in a Firefox extension that redirects user’s
requests to an external proxy, where a group of identities associated with cookies
are managed. These cookies replace the ones included in original requests, masking
a user’s identity, and are then forwarded to Google along with the original request.
Even when they allow users to send encrypted requests, user privacy can still be
compromised if collusion exists between the proxy server and Google servers.
Brave
It is a web browser —and not a plug-in— that natively embeds functions to block
intrusive ads and third-party tracking by default [62]. This proposal allows replac-
ing the ads available on the visited pages with others from Brave’s own advertising
network, claimed to be less intrusive and more privacy-friendly.
The proposed browser contemplates integrating users into the online advertising
business by paying them 15% of the gross ad revenue. In this regard, users are
given the option to donate such money to publishers, in exchange for an ad-free
browsing experience. Among other transparency functionalities, users may learn the
number and type of blocked ads, the trackers present on the visited pages and HTTP
redirections.
The upshot is that Brave operates similarly to an entire ad platform, but managed
by a single company. The solution completely dispenses with the present advertising
infrastructure and aims at building a new one, apparently fairer and more private.
However, this approach has sparked much criticism [121] since users’ browsing data
are collected and processed by a single company, which merely shift users’ trust from
the current multi-system advertising model to this new single entity.
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Subscribe2Web
Developed by Mozilla, Subscribe2Web [63] endeavored to address some of the privacy
risks examined in Sec. 3.2. Based on the idea that online advertising is crucial for the
present Web content model, Subscribe2Web looks for a way whereby the main actors
(in particular, content creators and users) can meet and have a natural exchange of
value. Mozilla’s proposal is to eliminate the current Web dependency on ads, in order
to fund the content creation by directly compensating content and service providers.
The aim is to provide the Web with an API accessible from any browser through which
users would pay a monthly subscription in exchange for accessing ad-free content.
Google Contributor
Contributor [122] was an initiative supported by Google to reduce the amount of ads
delivered by its advertising services. Its main aim is not directly related to protect
user privacy but to give users the possibility to eliminate ads from their favorite sites.
Because advertisers would be partially excluded by this approach, users registered
with this service would have to somewhat support the free ad sites by paying a
monthly fee. Thus, Contributor relies on a novel idea where users are considered as
active agents in the Web economic model.
Network-Level Ad Blocking
Recently, some Internet service providers have started to cooperate with ad companies
to implement ad blocking technologies [123] [124]. This is the case of Three, an
operator in the UK and Italy, which is working with Shine Technologies to deploy
network-based ad blocking.
With these network-level ad blocking practices, a new powerful agent breaks into
the online advertising ecosystem, stating that customers should have more control
over the content displayed on their browsers, especially when they would be paying
for every downloaded byte. Even though not much information is available about
the blocking mechanisms to be used, the goal would not be to eliminate advertising
but to give users more information (transparency) and the option to decide what to
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block (control). In the long term, this approach may help protect user privacy, offer
relevant and non-intrusive ads, and allow advertisers to take upon the data charges
for downloaded ads.
3.4 Discussion
In Secs. 3.1 and 3.2 we made it clear that online advertising is a market where the
exchanged goods are the users’ data. Therefore, the multiple interactions among
the entities of such a market might entail privacy risks for its users. Third-party
entities from online ad platforms, such as DSPs, SSPs and ad exchanges, and many
others offering a transport channel are especially responsible for the collection and
aggregation of most of the user information employed as the raw material for their
targeted ad delivery strategies.
The main concern of privacy advocates about online advertising is that the user
information collected by intermediate entities might be employed to uniquely identify
users or classify them in order to, for instance, discriminate their patterns of behavior.
This risk is significantly worse due to the following factors specific to the online
advertising ecosystem:
• most processes are performed in the background so the infrastructure is not
transparent by default for users;
• user data is massively collected by several intermediary entities;
• the user data are necessarily distributed and processed at very high speeds due
to the real-time requirements of advertising, which makes it difficult for ad
companies to anonymize and protect such data right after their collection;
• cooperation is encouraged between intermediate entities in terms of data shar-
ing;
• multiple items of information can be collected about users through non-consented
interactions that are indirectly triggered from users;
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• information about users along with processed metadata are commonly exchanged
in an unencrypted form between ad serving entities; and
• advanced, resistant and intrusive tracking mechanisms are used to identify users
online.
The inevitable consequence of the aforementioned procedures, supporting, in prac-
tice, the massive trade of user profiles, is the abusive and nonconsensual identification
and classification of users [71] which in extreme cases might entail, for instance, dis-
criminative treatment [93] when they receive online services. These factors of the
online advertising ecosystem promote the development of advanced mechanisms to
track users through the Web. Practices such as CM, flash cookie setting, canvas finger-
printing, and device fingerprinting in general are massively implemented [44,79,82,83]
and sometimes become so intrusive that users are tracked even when some of such fin-
gerprints have been deleted. Most of these practices build on cookies as a mechanism
to identify users and to even store information about them. Cookies are commonly
combined with other technologies such as canvas and device fingerprinting to obtain
a less ephemeral trace of users. Meanwhile, CM exploits the identifying strings re-
trieved by using cookies to promote massive cooperation among online advertising
entities.
The proved complexity of the online advertising ecosystem and the generalized
control that huge companies have acquired over ad distribution infrastructures [11,25]
significantly limits the scope of the proposed privacy protection policies. As a conse-
quence, most of the privacy-protecting approaches build on local mechanisms which
aim at disabling third-party interactions triggered from the user side to online adver-
tising infrastructures (mainly between users and SSPs), directly blocking user infor-
mation leakage. Such local approaches are commonly implemented as web browser
extensions that provide users with transparency and ad control functionalities [47,95].
Still located between users and SSPs, other proposals suggest filtering strategies car-
ried out by third-party entities (so-called brokers) [51–53] which may have access
to the interactions directly performed between a group of users and the advertising
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entities. Given the evident limitations of local approaches, some initiatives have envi-
sioned privacy-by-design advertising platforms where privacy guarantees are provided
with a global scope [62, 63, 122]. Interestingly, such initiatives agree on integrating
users into the advertising ecosystem.
Our analysis has examined privacy mechanisms with various levels of impact on
the Web. To start, offering transparency to users is probably the most appreciated fea-
ture of ad blockers (and research platforms such as AdReveal), which is complemented
with tracking blocking capabilities to give users a significant level of control. Notwith-
standing, the usability of ad blockers for nontechnical users is questionable [118] and
these approaches dismiss much, if not all, the current online advertising ecosystem,
thus hindering the current economic model of the Web supported by ads.
Even though some of these blocking-based solutions have become pretty popular
(e.g., Adblock Plus), the changing business models and default (whitelisting) behav-
iors of some of these commercial solutions have stirred great controversy. Fortunately,
other approaches supported by privacy activists, academics and foundations (such as
EFF) are proposing more adequate and usable technologies (e.g., Privacy Badger,
MyTrackingChoices) that may block tracking according to users’ preferences [94,95].
Other more refined variants of this blocking strategy are obfuscation and sandbox-
ing [52, 57, 58, 98] (proposed by Obliviad, AdJail, Privad, Adnostic, RePriv and
Ghostery). The ultimate aim of these mechanisms is also bounding the amount
of user information learned by ad platforms, while striving to adapt to the current
advertising business paradigm. As for the privacy threats posed by the structure and
capabilities of online advertising, by blocking third-party tracking most commercial
solutions claim to hamper cookie setting and thus CM. Canvas fingerprinting can be
blocked by most local solutions, yet only on a per-domain basis, the same way as
flash cookies. Remarkably, combining at least two ad blockers should offer enough
protection against most of the threats described in Sec. 3.2.
Finally, given the dynamic nature of user and ad platform economic incentives [125,
126] with respect to privacy, it seems reasonable to propose new and more private
ad distribution (and economic) models. Undoubtedly, this should be with the help
of mechanisms that allows users to play a more active role on deciding whether to
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be tracked or not [62, 63]. Inevitably, this level of control would imply an important
reduction in revenue for publishers, and thus require users to directly pay content
creators.
Since online privacy may be measured with respect to the interest of Web users
to protect their browsing data and that of adversaries to exploit such information,
analyzing the respective motivations of the different actors is also of great interest.
Without a doubt, economic incentives have encouraged intermediary entities, ad-
vertisers, publishers, and users to participate (consciously or not) in online adver-
tising. Users’ unconscious motivation to get involved in online advertising, playing
the role of the product, is linked to their need to access free content and services
on the Internet. Since the vast majority of Web content and services is paid from
advertisement revenue, users have few options to opt-out.
On the other hand, publishers need to help advertisers and ad platforms in their
bid to maximize their revenue. For this purpose, website owners are disposed to cede
valuable space in their sites and information about their users to such intermediary
parties, which thereafter will be responsible for deploying ad-delivery mechanisms.
Thus, in exchange for money, publishers surrender some control of its interaction with
users and indirectly participate in the disclosure of private contextual information to
ad platforms.
On the other side, the interest of advertisers in actively leaking user information is
rather reduced, unless several of them collude to share. However, advertisers typically
engage ad exchanges and DSPs’ services to receive contextual information, which may
be useful to deliver targeted ads. Therefore, advertisers’ incentives to collect user
information are high as well.
The commercial nature of online advertising has spurred a debate about the mo-
tivation of the involved entities to protect privacy and to profit from user data. Al-
though apparently opposed, the motivations of users and advertising intermediaries
for privacy might vary according to factors that are not commonly considered. Re-
search on the economic behavior of data holders in the market of online advertis-
ing [127] has shown that an increased level of user-targeting can reduce their profit
due to an exacerbated transfer of value to advertisers. Specifically, advertisers would
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be gradually less interested in bidding for user impressions as more detailed infor-
mation is given to them. That way, according to Bergemann and Bonatti [126], an
unexpected incentive may appear for data holders to provide reduced accuracy in the
exchanged user data, with the aim of generating greater demand from advertisers
and thus greater profit for data holders. Interestingly, such increase in profit may
lead to more privacy for users (given by the reduced precision of user data leaked
to advertisers). Nonetheless, a recent study by Taylor and Wagman [128] poses that
the effects of targeting capabilities on profits depend on market and is, consequently,
given by context.
Users seem to face a similar contextual dichotomy even though the concern about
privacy is generalized [129, 130]. The fact is that the creation of a marketplace in
personal data may shift the balance of power between individuals and companies
that gather data. According to some recent studies, this is a shift people would be
willing to embrace. Just over half of the 9 000 people surveyed worldwide said they
would share data about themselves with companies in exchange for cash [131]. A
separate survey has found that 42 percent of more than a thousand 13-17-year-olds
in the U.K. would rather accept cash for their personal data than earn money from a
job [132]. Lastly, it was reported in [133] that 56 percent of the consumers surveyed
would be willing to give up personal data provided that they received some kind
of economic compensation. This dichotomy between users’ concerns and intentions
regarding privacy might obey, according to Acquisiti et al. [125], to multidimensional
factors relative to the context where the user operates, such as their lack of awareness
about privacy risks, and cognitive and behavioral biases. The upshot is that users’
assessment of their own privacy will strictly shape the impact of external threats.
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 summarize our discussion of privacy technologies and how they
may address the threats identified in Sec. 3.2.
3.5 Conclusions
Online advertising has become ubiquitous on the Internet and the revenues ad serving




























































































































































Obfuscating user preferences may pre-
vent third-party tracking. But IP ad-
dress, user agents and other content
embedded in websites might still be
used as sources of fingerprinting
AdJail N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Provides security services such as in-
tegrity and confidentiality in the pub-
lisher side
Privad 3
May avoid third-party tracking, but
other user data such IP address and cer-
tain user agent may be used as sources
of fingerprinting
Adnostic 3 3 3
If enforced by ad platforms, it would
discourage third-party tracking. Pro-
tection against other threats is not con-
sidered
RePriv N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3 3
Users may control their browsing data
on their side, but nothing may prevent
external tracking
Privacy Badger 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Blocks most tracking mechanisms, but
little control is given to users
MyTrackingChoices 3 3 3 3 3
Users may block third-party tracking
on a more granular level, but protec-
tion is against previously defined sensi-
tive content
MyAdChoices 3 3 3
Does not prevent any form of tracking,
and ads are hidden from the user, not
blocked
AdReveal 3
Framework aimed at studying interest-
based and contextual advertising at
large scale
XRay 3 Platform, not intended for end users
Table 3.9: Online advertising privacy threats and academic proposals addressing them. (1) Since
this threat derives directly from interactions explicitly triggered by users, protecting from it is a
challenging task.
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AdBlock Plus 3 3 3 3 3 3
Protects against some of the analyzed
privacy threats, but threatens the eco-
nomic model of the Web
Ghostery 3 3 3 3 3 3
Offers additional transparency func-
tionalities to users regarding third-
party tracking
Google Sharing 3 3
Aimed at protecting users only from
cookie tracking performed by Google
Brave 3 3 (5) 3 3 3 3 3
Based on the paradigm of a more user-
driven ad platform; offers transparency
and a great level of control to users
Subscribe2Web N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Posits a future ad-free Web, but it
is unknown if this commercial solu-




N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Proposes an alternative economic
model for the Web, but it is not clear




3 3 3 3 3 3 3
At network level, Internet providers are
capable of offering similar blocking ser-
vices than those of ad blockers
Table 3.10: Online advertising privacy threats and commercial solutions addressing them. (1) Since
this threat derives directly from interactions explicitly triggered by users, protecting from it is a
challenging task; (2) most solutions only show the number of trackers detected/blocked; (3) control
is commonly enforced by given users blocking capabilities; (4) default configurations simplify their
use but at the expense of privacy; (5) fingerprinting protection is currently in beta version.
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a consequence of such ubiquity, online advertising has triggered the creation of a
massive transport channel whose intermediary components have access to billions of
users and, in particular, to their data. Even though gigabytes of aggregated user data
support more targeted advertising campaigns, the inherent lack of transparency of
online advertising entails serious risks to user privacy. In this chapter, by breaking
down the instances of online advertising platforms and their corresponding capabilities
(regarding user data), we have outlined an attacker model to describe the potential
hazards to user privacy. We have emphasized the variety of information subject to be
collected, the large number of intermediaries involved, their advanced and intrusive
tracking capabilities, and the impact of advertising practices on privacy.
Unlike what happens with other online privacy threats, there is little users can
do to completely prevent risks coupled with online advertising. Nevertheless, several
solutions are offered to help to protect the privacy of users within such an opaque
ecosystem. Accordingly, we have offered a wide range of mechanisms and we classified
them into local solutions (browser and third-party based) and proposals based on new
ad serving paradigms. On the one hand, some of the local solutions are very popular
and their blocking approaches are already negatively impacting the economic model
of online advertising. On the other hand, new advertising models are arising to offer
native privacy and a stronger role for the user, while still proposing radical variations
of the current advertising logic.
In addition, we have elaborated on the pros and cons of some of the aforemen-
tioned protection mechanisms with regard to the threats they try to alleviate within
online advertising platforms. In such analysis, we also have outlined dynamic and
smarter approaches proposed to avoid radical blocking mechanisms. Yet, based on
the proposals analyzed, we have found it very hard to provide more privacy in the
advertising ecosystem without significantly modifying the ad delivery model to give
users more control and to reduce the financial dependence of Internet content on
advertising.
Chapter 4
Privacy by Regulating the
Distribution of Personal Data
4.1 Introduction
The growing access of people to information and communication technologies is con-
tributing to reach the so-called “big data era”, where the pervasiveness of data is a
major input for increasingly personalized and automated online services. Among such
services, online advertising aims at selecting and directing ads to the right potential
customers (personalization) at the right time (real-time), built on multiple parame-
ters, while users browse the Web [2–4]. Many details of this operation are given in
Sec. 2.3.
This targeted advertising offers crucial benefits to several agents on the Internet.
To start, users receive ads tailored to their interests and no longer static ads unre-
lated to their preferences; consequently, behavioral targeting are generating greater
revenues than those of untargeted ads [26]. Furthermore, as previously described in
Sec. 2.3, web sites (publishers) have access to an entire ecosystem to fund their opera-
tion through the money paid by demand side platforms (DSPs), which are advertising
agencies acting in representation of advertisers(a). Also, selling entities are given the
(a)When referring to the online advertising model in general, the terms ’buyer’, DSP and ’advertiser’
may be used interchangeably.
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opportunity to promote their products over a ubiquitous structure with global reach.
The upshot is that most of the content users consume online is supported by ad
revenue.
We introduced in Sec. 2.4 one of the key enabling technologies that makes online
advertising so profitable: real-time bidding, which enables advertisers to compete in
real-time auctions to show their ads [25]. It is implemented by a management entity
called ad exchange. Accordingly, when a user visits a website, her impression is sold
to the advertiser (or corresponding DSP) that bids higher, in a matter of milliseconds.
Moreover, DSPs are sent bid request messages containing user information (tracking
data) to help them tailor ads to the user’s preferences and decide the bidding strategy.
In this way, RTB’s aim is twofold: offering users a personalized experience through
targeted ads and, thus, maximizing the profits of the whole advertising ecosystem.
Whereas the operation of RTB behind the scenes is pretty opaque and complex for
users [134], it is quite transparent for the actors of the advertising ecosystem. For
example, ad exchanges provide DSPs with powerful management interfaces that offer
very detailed information about the market and even enable buyers to set up their
advertising strategies (e.g., by defining a targeting market). Certainly, a lot of benefits
arise for the advertising ecosystem from the optimization capability offered by RTB
in terms of automation, personalization, profit, and transparency.
Yet, despite its proven usefulness, the practices inherent to online advertising and
RTB may pose serious privacy risks (see Sec. 3.2 for details) for users [17]. Most
of these risks derive from the potential misuse of the user data flowing through the
advertising ecosystem. To start, vast user data is mined at very high rates to imple-
ment real-time personalization; hence, truly detailed profiles are built about millions
of people so fast and uncontrollably [74] that privacy protection is discouraged. Addi-
tionally, ad distribution mechanisms based on auctioning user impressions might lead
to characterize users as more relevant (or more valuable economically) than others,
depending on their profiles [14]; such a differentiation may entail social sorting or
discrimination [15], thus an even less private environment. Finally, online advertising
builds on interactions among myriads of intermediary ad companies that collect, use
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and share user data, significantly increasing the risk of data misuse. Ironically, users
have no control over how their data is managed in this context.
RTB builds on sharing user data with DSPs to encourage competition and ad per-
sonalization, but the unregulated distribution of such data may give rise to concerns.
With the aim of helping DSPs decide whether to bid or not for a user impression,
an ad exchange distributes to them personal information of the user whose impres-
sion is being auctioned (e.g., the URL being visited, the location of the user, or even
a label categorizing the user). Thus, not only does the winner DSP receives this
input, but also the rest of participating DSPs. This means that there could be agen-
cies maliciously collecting data without even paying for it. We illustrate this risk in
Sec. 4.2 where we unveil that a given DSP would have paid nothing for at least 55%
of the users it tracked in a period of three months. This uncontrolled distribution
of user data prompts a non-negligible privacy concern since an increasing number
of advertising agencies are relying on RTB to daily reach billions of potential web
customers [135]. Although the distribution of personal data among a group of DSPs
cannot be entirely stopped without changing the current advertising business model,
we report that the potential abuse of these agencies can be tackled with minimum
tuning of said data distribution model.
Our proposal in this chapter builds on regulating the distribution of personal
data from the ad exchange to DSPs when a user impression is auctioned. Such
regulation consists essentially in limiting the number of DSPs invited to bid, that
is, lowering the entities to which user data is leaked and, consequently, getting a
more private environment. Accordingly, DSPs or similar intermediaries showing a
dishonest behavior (e.g., never winning auctions) will be banned from participating
in future auctions, which may entail correcting such harmful behaviors. At the same
time, our approach strives to maximize the revenue of the ad exchange, looking for a
balance with a given privacy level. The upshot is that some privacy can be reached
without affecting the business model of the online advertising ecosystem, by slightly
modifying the distribution of personal data among intermediary entities such as DSPs.
The resulting adjusting effect on the behavior of these entities is relevant since privacy
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concerns in general do not directly derive from the act of sharing data itself, but from
the inappropriate sharing of user information [13].
Unlike our approach, other proposals have addressed this privacy issue through
more radical strategies. Research proposals have concentrated on sophisticated mech-
anisms to anonymize or block the information leaked to third-parties while trying to
remain compatible with the current ecosystem, but still requiring important modi-
fications to its architecture and anyhow affecting its economy. On the other hand,
commercial solutions have primarily focused on blocking tracking mechanisms at the
cost of seriously damaging the Internet business model. However, as concluded in [17],
it seems very hard to provide more privacy in the online advertising ecosystem without
somehow modifying the ad delivery model.
4.1.1 Main requirements of the system
In this subsection we anticipate the main requirements around which our proposal in
this chapter revolves, in order to guide the approaches we present in next sections.
• Simple implementation. To encourage its implementation in practice, we pro-
mote a solution that does not require modifying significantly the architecture of
the online advertising ecosystem. This would imply a low adoption cost, unlike
other academic approaches that propose rebuilding the current model to protect
privacy.
• Constructive technique. Looking for an alternative to the arms race started
by ad blockers, which is threatening the economy of the Web, we require a
mechanism aimed to balance the tradeoff between user privacy and advertising
utility (commonly in terms of money). This would limit the level of attainable
privacy, but would open the door to further tangible mechanisms to address
privacy concerns in this opaque environment.
• Self-regulatory. In line with a constructive approach, we uphold a system that
allows misbehaving entities to correct their practices against privacy, under the
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penalty of dynamic punishment. Namely, we require a solution that promotes
appropriate practices towards user data to relieve privacy concerns.
Interestingly, the compliance with these three main requirements when designing
our system will derive in additional aspects that may go in favor of user privacy.
The work presented in this chapter was published in [16].
Chapter outline
In this chapter, we illustrate the potential misuse of RTB with real data from a
publicly available data set. We analyze the data of more than 64 millions of ad-
auctions and interactions between a DSP and an ad exchange, to quantify the extent
to which a DSP may collect user tracking data without paying for them. Namely, we
performed a study reporting quantitative evidences on the misuse of RTB.
Since no preventive mechanism is currently put in place by Google’s DoubleClick
and AppNexus (the most relevant RTB systems), we hypothesize that such tracking
and profiling practices may be rather common. To address this state of affairs, we
design a system that aims to regulate the distribution of user data to third parties
during the auctions for ad-impressions, i.e., to whom send the requests for each ad-
space bidding.
The proposed solution is designed to strike a balance between the average num-
ber of DSPs invited to bid and the revenue of the ad exchange holding the auctions.
Limiting the number of DSPs receiving user profiles naturally offer better privacy
protection, especially since potential dishonest DSPs will hardly receive user sensi-
tive information under such context. As a consequence, an ad exchange might be
motivated to suppress the bid requests to abusing DSPs, but this would have an im-
pact on its revenue. We formulate the problem of choosing a bid-request distribution
as a multi-objective optimization problem that takes into account both aspects, i.e.,
the number of DSPs invited to bid and RTB profits.
We measure the extent to which user data is disseminated as the average number
of DSPs receiving tracking data. Accordingly, for a desired data distribution strategy,
our solution recommends, probabilistically and in real time, to which DSPs the ad
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exchange should send a bid request for any given ad impression, in order to maximize
the instant revenue. Evidently, with the aim of preventing abuses and thus supporting
privacy, the fewer DSPs receive personal data the better. Experimental results show
that our system seems to be able to tackle misbehaving DSPs.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 analyses the
potential abuses and privacy risks we face in this context. Section 4.3 presents
the theoretical analysis of our regulating approach. In Sec. 4.4, we evaluate our
technique. Section 4.5 includes a relevant discussion about important topics of our
approach and some general incentives to adopt it. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Sec. 4.6.
4.2 Privacy risks of Data Aggregation in Online
Advertising
This section examines in depth the potential abuse and privacy risk object of this
chapter. We emphasize that these issues derive from the capability of DSPs to track
and profile users almost effortlessly and at very low cost. More specifically, user
privacy in RTB systems is at risk as a result of: (1) user information is shared with
third parties by default; (2) this information is not only delivered to the winner of an
auction but also to other entities, and (3) there is an apparent lack of control over
the abuse of potential malicious listeners.
Some guidelines are stated by the ad exchange (e.g., Google DoubleClick) regard-
ing the use of auction data. Yet there are not known mechanisms to control such
abuse from certain DSPs. Next, to illustrate the aforementioned privacy risk, we
analyze a publicly available data set containing bid information of a Chinese DSP.
4.2.1 RTB: the auction technology behind online advertising
When a user visits a Web site with an ad space served through RTB [25], an HTTP
request is submitted to the ad exchange, which subsequently sends “bid requests” to
potential participants. We note that the number and type of participants involved
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may vary on a per-auction basis, at the ad exchange’s discretion. Within the bid
request, the ad exchange generally includes the following data: the URL of the page
being visited by the user; the topic category of the page; the user’s IP address or parts
of it; and other information related to their Web browser [12, 14, 35]. Accompanying
this information, Google’s ad exchange incorporates a bidder specific user ID, which
implies that different bidders are given different IDs for a same user. Other RTB-
based ad exchanges, alternatively, include their own user’s cookies.
Upon receiving the bid request, the bidder may identify the user within its own
database through the cookie or identifier. This is provided that the cookie-matching
protocol has been executed previously for this user. Thanks to such cookie or iden-
tifier, the bidder can track them across those Web pages in which it is invited to
bid [44]. From those tracked pages, the bidder can therefore build a profile, maybe
complementing tracking and other personal data it may have about the user [41].
The bid price is then set on the basis of the bidder’s targeting objectives, that is,
whether it aims to target users visiting certain site categories, browsing from a given
location, and/or having some specific profile. To evaluate if the ad-impression meets
such objectives, the bidder relies on the aforementioned profile and the information
included in the bid request. If interested, the bidder submits a price to the ad
exchange, which finally, in a last step, allows the winning bidder to deliver the ad
to the user. The winning bidder is evidently the highest bidder, but the price paid
is the second-highest bid in the auction [136]; these so called second-price auctions
look after preventing underbidding and overbidding. It is worth stressing that all this
process of gathering user data, ad bidding and delivering is conducted in just tens of
milliseconds.
4.2.2 Bid requests: the tokens leaking personal data
As explained in Sec. 4.2.1, a bid request not only serves to invite DSPs to participate
in the auction of a user’s impression. A bid request includes a variety of user data in
order to provide DSPs with the necessary feedback to decide whether to bid or not for
said impression. Then, interested DSPs send their bids to the ad exchange in order











Figure 4.1: Interactions among an ad exchange and associated DSPs.
for an auction to be held. Evidently, the success of personalized advertising tightly
depends on the granularity and volume of the information shared with DSPs. Sadly,
user privacy decreases to the same extent that personalization improves. As an ap-
proach to evidence this privacy risk, we here portray the critical information available
about the user and included in bid requests. Figure 4.1 depicts the aforementioned
interactions among an ad exchange and DSPs. Considering that these interactions
are carried out for every single user impression, it illustrates the wealth of personal
information flowing to potential participants in the bidding process.
Dozens of fields and subfields carry information concerning the context in which a
user impression is held [137]. As described previously, users play a leading role in this
context. Thus, much of the information carried to fuel the RTB process characterizes
them and, particularly, their behavior. First, a bid request may include a user’s ID
that DSPs may use to individuate them and match previously acquired information
with the data included in bid requests. A user ID may be a string that unambiguously
identify a user in a given system but not in real life, e.g., within the ad exchange’s
domain. Furthermore, the user’s IP address (or part of it) is included in bid requests
mostly to help DSPs infer location information to execute geographically targeted
campaigns. IP addresses can also be used as user identifiers, especially now that
IPv6 is providing an almost unlimited addressing space.
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Additionally, device and web browser fingerprint data may be contained in a bid
request, as powerful attributes to better identify users. A fingerprint is a set of
attribute values that characterizes an entity to the point that could individuate it
unequivocally. For example, a fingerprint of a network device might be composed by
its operating system’s name, its version, the list of applications installed and the list
of open ports of the device.
Information about the users’ online behavior may also be included in the bid
requests sent to DSPs, e.g., in the form of a list of (user profile) tags or categories.
These categories reveal the preferences of the user whose impression is auctioned,
thus are crucial for DSPs when deciding whether to bid or not. Similar tags depicting
the content of the website visited by the user might also be delivered to DSPs along
with its URL or domain. Finally, a time stamp indicating the date and time of the
user’s visit, and a reference bidding price to inform the minimum value to bid may
be provided by bid requests.
Several privacy risks may derive from this personal information, especially when
distributed among several intermediate entities such as DSPs, in a position to ag-
gregate and process said information. To start, although user IDs do not identify a
user in real life, a combination of the remaining attributes may inequivocally individ-
uate a user (a few demographic attributes have such an identification power [138]).
Users’ location information could lead an attacker to learn moving patterns of users
to then reveal even further details about their daily activities [139]. Device and
web browser fingerprints may complement this attack by enabling cross device track-
ing [140]. Not only could users and their activities be geographically tracked using
data in bid requests, but also their preferences are learned and may reveal sensitive
information[141]. In fact, pricing information is already a critical aspect that directly
discloses the relative importance of a user. Table 4.1 maps some of these informa-
tion items to the potential privacy risks derived from their open distribution and
aggregation.
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Table 4.1: Information, items carried in bid requests, here matched to the potential privacy risks















user location x x x
device fingerprint x x x
web browser fingerprint x x x
time stamp x
user languages x x
user labels x x
URL x
content labels x
minimum bid price x x
4.2.3 The iPinYou data set
To illustrate the potential misuse of RTB systems and its real impact on user privacy,
we analyze a data set that includes bid information released by a well-known Chinese
DSP called iPinYou.
The iPinYou data set [142] contains logs of the ad auctions where this DSP has
participated. These logs basically carry three types of information for each auction:
(1) user data sent by the ad exchange to the DSP in order for the latter to prepare
a bid response, (2) the price paid when it wins the auction, and (3) information on
whether the user made a click or a conversion as a response from the ad displayed.
User data include some of the parameters described in Sec. 4.2.2, e.g., an ID of the
user that generated the auction, a timestamp, their browser fingerprint (user-agent),
their IP address (its first 3 bytes), their location (region and city), the domain and
URL visited, and some user tags representing the categories of interest of the user.
Additional information involves the ad exchange that held an auction and the price
paid by a DSP (not necessarily iPinYou) to won it. The values of some of these
attributes, e.g., IP address, URL and domain visited, are anonymized to preserve the
privacy of users. It is important to note that this data set contains information related
to the bids in which iPinYou participated, excluding the auctions where iPinYou
decided not to bid.
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Table 4.2: Parameters describing the iPinYou data set. This includes, e.g., the number of bid log
records, unique users involved, or the number of Chinese cities reached.
Bid log records 64.746.749
Logs of won bid requests 19.495.976
Unique users 21.264.865




User profile tags 44
This data set was released in 2013 for an open contest on RTB ad pricing. For
the purpose of our analysis, we use the version processed by Zhang et al in [142].
We aggregated the data from seasons 2 and 3 of the competition (data from season
1 has different fields than the rest) and we examined the data of almost 65 million
bid requests sent to this DSP. We found that these bid requests belong to about 21
million unique users. In Table 4.2 we summarize the most relevant figures of the data
set at hand. In order to facilitate the processing of this data, we used a sample of bid
requests corresponding to the users having 70 or more log records in the whole data
set, yielding almost 6 thousand users with more than 8 thousands log records.
4.2.4 Privacy risks and abusing context
User privacy risk starts from the capability of an ad exchange to identify the user
whose impression is being auctioned. The user ID attribute included in bid requests
and thus sent to DSPs unequivocally identifies a user within that context. In fact, if
this identifier is already known by a DSP, they could match even more information
about the user. In addition, recall, e.g., that a few combined demographic attributes
may be very identifiable. Consequently, other attributes such as the user’s IP address
and the device fingerprint [46] might make this risk worse. Namely, although not
real-life identifiers, user IDs, when combined with other bid request fields of infor-
mation, might significantly facilitate the work of a privacy adversary in its bid for
individuating a victim.
Public IP addresses could by themselves be very identifiable, too. For this reason,
only the first three octets are commonly revealed in bid requests, but it is still evident
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when the address changes. The uniform change of a user’s IP address through the
day, if a user is tracked across different geographical areas, might unveil movement
patterns, which is sensitive information with regard to user privacy [143]. With
respect to this, within the iPinYou data set, we found that a great portion of users
(about thirty percent) were associated with three or more different IP addresses.
In addition to IP addresses, other attributes with rare attribute values may help
adversaries single out users in real life, even more when analyzed in combination
with other attributes. For example, people using Linux operating systems and non
standard web browsers (e.g., Opera) could excel so much to become easily identifiable
outliers. To have an idea of this, in the iPinYou data set, we found only 206 bid
requests (out of millions) including user information coupled with the combination of
Linux operating system and the Opera browser.
This process of associating a user’s unique identity with their interactions en-
ables tracking. Then, working in real time, tracking allows advertising entities to
“recognize” users during their impressions and ultimately display a personalized ad.
However, tracking also enables these entities to join personal information to build in-
dividual user profiles (profiling). As in other personalization contexts, such tracking
and profiling capabilities are supported by the processing of personal information.
Nevertheless, within advertising platforms, personal information flows freely, con-
stantly, and abundantly from the ad exchange to DSPs. Thus, a sort of oversending
of personal data to third parties might be supporting misuse and worsening privacy
risks.
The last statement implies that DSPs essentially do not pay for the user informa-
tion they receive in bid requests, but for the auctions they win on behalf of advertisers.
In practice, upon the reception of bid requests (invitations to participate in auctions),
a DSP pays just for the auctions it wins, while it receives user data in the rest of bid
requests “for free”. Clearly, DSPs may take advantage of the ad exchange’s tracking
resources at a very low cost. This fact is evidenced in Fig. 4.2, where we depict the
amount of users whose information has been paid by the iPinYou DSP. To illustrate
the amount of information potentially collected for free, we can see in this figure that,
for about 55% of the users, this DSP has not paid for any of their bids. From this
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of users whose information has been paid by the iPinYou DSP. For about
55% of the users, none of the bid requests triggered from their impressions were paid by the DSP,
i.e., the DSP did not pay anything for the auctions held for 55% of the users.
we can infer the potential abuse of a third party and the exacerbated risk for the
privacy of users if multiple DSPs exhibit a behavior not oriented to participate in
auctions, but to take advantage of the large amount of user data distributed by an ad
exchange. We would like to stress, however, that this percentage of users tracked for
free might be just a lower bound: the released data set does not include the auctions
where iPinYou did not bid, but from which it could have received numerous user data
costing nothing.
In an attempt to prevent this abuse, ad exchanges clearly prohibit DSPs to use
the information in bid requests when a corresponding auction has not been won [144].
It is also not allowed to use this information for applications other than the ones re-
lated to online advertising. However, enforcing such use is hard when the information
has already been distributed to third parties; and when, due to an increasingly com-
plex advertising ecosystem, more and more entities are included to outsource specific
functions in the demand side (e.g., trading desks).
Data aggregation performed by intermediate entities brings another privacy jeop-
ardy in online platforms. As explained in Sec. 4.2, not only ad exchanges, the core
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Figure 4.3: Amount of users tracked by the most popular domains in the iPinYou data set.
of ad distribution, but also DSPs and even publishers are in a position to concen-
trate user data. As expected, in the iPinYou data set, user tracking is concentrated
in Google’s DoubleClick ad exchange. Furthermore, we found that more than fifty
percent of the users in the iPinYou data set would be tracked by only two publishers,
probably related to the most popular websites in China (Fig. 4.3). In other words,
having recognized at least 2063 publishers in this data set, less than 0.1% of them
concentrates the tracking of more than 50% of the involved users. Powerful tracking
capabilities are then held in very few hands.
Not only the easiness and openness of data collection is threatening the privacy of
Internet users, but also the level of detail of the data. The granularity of the user data
held by these entities has given rise to powerful capabilities of microtargeting. These
capabilities have derived in tools to select audiences that may enable even advertisers
to target groups of users with great precision [145]. In Fig. 4.4, we show an interface
offered by a social network and a DSP to choose an audience for better ad targeting.
Finally, due to the pervasiveness of online advertising, it is not hard to com-
prehend its wide reach in the population. The idea that the advertising ecosystem
might be collecting information related to large masses of people is reflected in the
iPinYou data set. More precisely, based on the user ID and region attributes of the
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Figure 4.4: Interface for advertisers to select an audience for a campaign in Facebook. Its very
granular options allow a great power to microtarget users.











































Figure 4.5: Population tracked by online advertising entities along different regions of China, as
observed in the iPinYou data set.
records from this data set, we observed that large portions of the population of im-
portant Chinese regions would have been tracked. For example, this DSP (iPinYou)
would have information of more than 5% of the population in regions such as Beijing,
Guangdong, and Shanghai (see Fig. 4.5). Considering that, in this case, most of the
user data must be “ceded” as input to DSPs for their bidding decisions, gathering
such bulks of information seems a very good deal for them. However, this is not good
news for the privacy of users, who are probably being observed en masse.
4.3 Controlled Distribution of Bid Requests
Along this section, we propose a system that aims to reduce the oversending of per-
sonal data to DSPs, thus ultimately providing some privacy to users in RTB systems.
This is done by regulating the distribution of bid requests among intermediary en-
tities such as DSPs or trading desks. Conceptually, this objective could be reached,
to a certain extent, by reducing the number of DSPs to which bid requests are sent,
thus lowering the instances where user data is aggregated. Naturally, from a practi-
cal perspective, our solution is conceived to be implemented within the ad exchange
infrastructure since it is the entity in charge of sending bid requests to DSPs when
a potential ad impression arises. The proposed system determines, in real time and
adaptively, the specific participants of a given ad-space auction, at the cost of some
processing overhead at the ad exchange and a potential reduction in revenue incurred
by a smaller number of participants in auctions. Being revenue the raison d’être of ad
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exchanges, a trade-off will arise with data distribution control, but with an adequate
balance we show that reasonable guarantees can be provided while keeping relatively
high profits.
Unlike many of the privacy techniques proposed in the literature for online adver-
tising, a change in the distribution model of bid requests does not entail an important
modification of the advertising ecosystem.
4.3.1 Adversary model
Our technique builds upon the principle of a selective distribution of bid-request in-
formation (containing user sensitive data) among potentially interested DSPs. Con-
sistently with this principle, we assume an adversary model in which the bid requests
sent by an ad exchange are passively observed and maliciously aggregated by a group
of intermediary entities.
We must stress that this adversary model assumes that privacy risk comes from
the exploitation of user profiles built from the aggregation of user data. Namely, the
user data in a single bid request would not entail a significant privacy risk since by
itself reveals only a snapshot of the preferences, behavior and demographics of a user
at a certain point in time. However, the more user data is aggregated the richer are
the resulting profiles, and the higher is the corresponding privacy risk.
As argued in Sec. 4.2, RTB-based ecosystems still provide fertile ground for privacy
abuse. One of the reasons is the relative ease with which user data can be collected
by intermediate and authorized entities such as DSPs and other smaller subsidiary
entities (e.g. trading desks). Especially the latter, sometimes being really small
companies, are becoming capable of tracking users at a very low cost (or none) and
without deploying an important infrastructure. Thus, a privacy gap arises when they
are given easy access to an ever-growing universe of aggregated personal data. We
propose a system to bridge this gap by penalizing said kind of tracking when it violates
the norms established by ad exchanges.
As a note, abusing of such tracking is against the terms of use of the main ad
exchanges. These terms forbid DSPs taking advantage of data for which they have
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Table 4.3: Behaviors of DSPs, with regard to their participation in bid auctions, that may go against
ad exchanges policies and also in favor of the violation of users’ privacy
Behavior Description
silent
A DSP not participating in auctions, and thus not
answering bid requests, may be misusing the RTB
infrastructure by collecting and exploiting the user
data carried in theses messages. Ad exchanges re-
cognize said risk when forbidding DSPs using the
data for which they have not paid in their policies
[144]. Although this also gives rise to privacy con-
cerns, no further control is made.
loser
A DSP that looses too many auctions is also susp-
icious of abusing the RTB infrastructure against
privacy. Bidding to loose is possible since bid req-
uests sent to DSPs include information about the
minimum price of the user impression auctioned.
Just by bidding below the minimum would enable
DSPs or related entities to receive user data for free.
stingy
A DSP bidding too low might be looking for recei-
ving user data when no pricing information is rec-
eived in bid requests, thus trying to inappropriate-
ly exploit the RTB logic in detriment of privacy.
not paid. For example, according to Google DoubleClick Ad Exchange (AdX) Buyer
Program Guidelines [144], some of the policies that buyers must adhere to are listed
next:
• Buyers and any third party to which they provide access to the ad exchange
must adhere to the policies.
• The inventory purchased cannot be sold to another sales channel.
• Bid data cannot be used for purposes different from buying on the ad exchange.
• Unless a buyer wins a given impression, it must not use bid data for that
impression to create user lists or profile users.
In brief, neither DSPs nor outsourced entities such as trading desks are allowed to
exploit bid data coming from an ad exchange, unless they have paid for such data after
winning a given auction. Some of the behaviors that might go against ad exchange’s
policies are described in Table 4.3.
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4.3.2 Bid request distribution model
As noted in Sec. 4.2.1, the visit of a user to a website that holds an ad space generates a
so-called ad impression. Then, an ad exchange auctions said impression among all the
available DSPs. To support the bidding decision of DSPs, the ad exchange distributes
among them bid requests containing some user data.
We propose reducing the number of DSPs to which a bid request is sent, in order
to penalize misbehaving DSPs and to promote privacy. To model the distribution
of bid requests, we rely on the Bernoulli distribution that characterizes a discrete
probability distribution of a random variable whose value is true with probability p
and false with probability 1− p. This is the same behavior of the outcome of sending
bid requests to DSPs; they will receive requests if behaving well or will not receive
bid requests (penalized) if being dishonest. Accordingly, being d the number of DSPs
available in a given moment, we model the distribution of bid requests among them
as the execution of d Bernoulli trials (or experiments).
These trials can be represented as d independent, identically distributed Bernoulli
random variables (r.v.’s) X1, . . . , Xd, each of which characterizes an experiment with
a boolean-valued outcome and a success probability pi, with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1. Therefore,
when auctioning a user impression, the ad exchange shall send a bid request to DSPi
with probability pi and shall not do it with probability 1− pi. A given ad exchange’s
distribution strategy will be defined as the tuple p = (p1, . . . , pd) of the probabilities
of sending a bid request to each of the d available DSPs. In Fig. 4.6, we depict this
distribution model for a given user impression.
As introduced previously, to control misbehaving DSPs, we propose bounding the
number of DSPs that receive a bid request from the ad exchange. Intuitively, the
less the number of receiving DSPs, the higher the level of user privacy. To do it,
we introduce a data distribution control parameter defined as the average number of
DSPs that will receive a bid request, α, with 0 ≤ α ≤ d. Namely, in our system,
the number of recipient DSPs is bounded to the value of α. Clearly, the number of
invited DSPs, being a sum of independent Bernoulli trials, follows a Poisson binomial
distribution with mean
∑
i pi. Consequently, our measure of privacy, the average
number of participating DSPs, can be computed straightforwardly as α =
∑
i pi.












Figure 4.6: A depiction of the bid request distribution model we propose for the ad exchange. We
model said distribution as the random draw of d Bernoulli trials (represented with d Bernoulli r.v.’s:
X1, . . . , Xd), being d the number of DSPs available. Each r.v. characterizes an experiment with a
boolean-valued outcome and a success probability pi.
4.3.3 A system to balance the number of DSPs invited and
ad revenue
In Sec. 4.3.1 we described the adversary model we tackle in this chapter. In par-
ticular, we mentioned that DSPs might go against the policies of the corresponding
ad exchange by exploiting a uncontrolled distribution of bid requests. Nevertheless,
implementing these policies is by no means a simple task because ad exchanges have
no control over the internal dynamics of buyers’ data infrastructures. In any case,
they do have the capability to regulate how bid requests are distributed to buyers.
Then, it is by shaping such distribution of user data, according to the behavior of
DSPs, that we propose to bound the amount of information (bid requests) sent to
DSPs, with the ultimate aim of enhancing privacy.
Intuitively, a distribution strategy that restricts the recipients of bid requests will
reduce the revenue of an ad exchange. Accordingly, we define a metric of said revenue,
in a given auction, as the product of three variables ωi, µi and pi, for i = 1, . . . , d. Note
that maximizing this measure of revenue would imply maximizing the real revenue,
according to the distribution model proposed in this chapter. Both ωi and µi are
system parameters taking values in R and could be interpreted as reputation metrics
of a DSP i. A DSP that behaves according to the ad exchange’s rules will generate
84 CHAPTER 4. PRIVACY BY REGULATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL DATA
a reasonable revenue and thus will have a better reputation than other DSPs that
break the rules. For each DSP i, we define the winning rate ωi as the rate of won bids
with respect to the number of bid requests received up to a given instant. Weighting
by winning rate enables our model to discourage a potential misuse of the bid request
distribution model in online advertising. A DSP that almost always loses is probably
just “listening” for user data to tamper with their privacy, thus deceitfully exploiting
the online advertising ecosystem. In our proposal, the economical contribution of a
DSP winning only a few auctions, even bidding high, will be weighted by its poor
wining rate in order to counteract its behavior against privacy.
In addition, we define µi as the average money spent by a DSP up to a given
instant, that is, the amount of money paid for the won bids divided by the number
of bid requests received (average money spent). Next, for the sake of simplicity, we
refer to the product of ωi and µi as ri. For the sake of clarity, please refer to Table 4.4
to find the notation used in this analysis.
We denote by p the strategy of distributing bid requests where pi, already defined
in Sec. 4.3.2, could be seen as the percentage of traffic sent to DSPi. Evidently, the
higher the winning rate ωi and the average money spent of a DSPi, µi, the more likely
it is to win an auction (thus having a higher “reputation”). Naturally interested in
reaching the maximum possible revenue, an ad exchange will try to send a bid request
to the DSPs with the highest product ri. However, for DSPs with low ri, i.e., showing
bad behavior, in order not to completely eliminate their opportunity to participate
in auctions, we will impose a tolerance parameter, i.e., a lower bound on pi, denoted
by pmin > 0. Thus, with pmin ≤ pi, we try to guarantee, for said DSPs, the chance to
improve their behavior (reputation) in the future.
According to the justifications in Sec. 4.3.2, in our approach we use the parameter
α to bound the number of DSPs invited to bid (invitation rate) and that will receive
information from the ad exchange. Put another way, α could also be interpreted as
a measure of the suppression of bid requests to DSPs. Consistently with this bound,
we define a revenue-invitation rate function
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Table 4.4: Description of the main variables used in our notation.
Symbol Description
d Number of DSPs available in our scenario
p Tuple representing the ad exchange’s distribution strategy. Its elements are the probabilities of sending a bid request to each DSP
α Average number of DSPs that will receive a bid request, i.e., the average number of DSPs to be invited to the auctions
ωi Rate of won bids with respect to the number of bid requests received by a DSP i up to a given instant
µi Average money spent by the i-th DSP up to a given instant
ri The product of ωiµi
pmin Lower bound on pi that guarantees an opportunity to participate in auctions for all DSPs







which characterizes the optimal trade-off between revenue R and the number of DSPs
invited to bid α. From this expression, we aim at finding an optimal strategy of bid
request distribution p∗, that satisfies an average participating DSPs α while maxi-
mizing the resulting ad exchange’s revenue R. Note that this expression establishes
a strict restriction (it must be fulfilled) regarding the limit of DSPs that will receive
invitations by the ad exchange (α), while its revenue is maximized in a best-effort
sense. We would like to stress that the priority in our definition is meeting this bound,
i.e., to prevent abuse and mitigate the privacy risk.
Although we propose modulating (or restricting) the distribution of bid requests
to DSPs such that more privacy is provided to users, this does not necessarily imply
that ad exchanges lose control to exploit user data. In fact, our approach would leave
unchanged the internal logic within ad exchanges for the sake of simplicity and appli-
cability; this includes how user data is collected and processed by ad exchanges. Our
proposal focuses rather on the flow of user information from ad exchanges to DSPs,
since unnecessary interactions threatening privacy may arise in such data sharing
context.
Having presented the main parameters and indicators of our system, we summarize
in the next list of steps the actions that the ad exchange must perform to integrate
our approach to the auctioning system. Also Fig. 4.7 illustrates this integration and
later on is used to describe the evaluation methodology of our bid request distribution
strategy.






























Figure 4.7: Methodology implemented to assess our bid request distribution strategy. This flowchart
also illustrates how our system integrates to the ad exchange’s auctioning system as described in
Sec. 4.3.3 (the blocks in blue).
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Step 1: Set the design parameters of the system: a bid request distribution (privacy)
parameter α and a tolerance parameter pmin.
Step 2: For each d DSPs, compute and update their variable behavior (reputation)
indicators based on their win rate and money spent (ωi, µi).
Step 3: Find an optimal distribution strategy of bid requests p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
d) that
balance a measure of privacy with revenue.
Step 4: Send bid requests (invitations) only to the α DSPs showing the best behavior
indicators.
Step 5: Receive bid responses and auction the user impression.
4.3.4 Optimal strategy for the distribution of bid requests
In this section, we analyze the revenue-invitation rate function (4.1) defined in Sec. 4.3.3,
and present a closed-form solution, albeit piecewise, to the maximization problem.
We suppose, without loss of generality, that
r1 ≥ . . . ≥ rd. (4.2)
Also, for k = 1, . . . d, we define a sequence of thresholds αk as
k(1− pmin)− d pmin.




1 , j = 1, . . . , k − 1
α− pmin(d− k)− (k − 1) , j = k
pmin , j = k + 1, . . . , d
(4.3)
and the corresponding maximum revenue yields
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Proof. The existence and uniqueness of the solution is a consequence of the fact that
we maximize a continuous function over a compact set.
From the assumption (4.2), it follows intuitively that for an α < 1 the solution
consists in sending a bid request to the first DSP, i.e., to the DSP having the maximum
product ωiµi. However, the condition p > pmin ensures the resource, α, must be
distributed across all other DSPs, so that all participants can have a chance to receive
a bid. The amount of α to be distributed is clearly dpmin and hence the remainder




Following the same intuitive principle described above, we proceed to examine
the distribution strategy of the remaining α′. Note that, below, all the expressions in
terms of α′ can be recast in terms of α′ on account of α = α′ + pmin. For notational
convenience, define p′ = p− pmin.
Case 1. 0 ≤ α′ ≤ 1− pmin.
Observe that, in this case, any feasible p′ = (p′1, . . . , p
′
d) satisfies
p′1r1 + . . .+ p
′
drd ≤ (p′1 + . . .+ p′d)r1 = α′r1,
which implies that the optimal distribution strategy consists in assigning the whole
α′ to the first DSP, that is p∗1 = α
′ and p∗i = 0 for i 6= 1. More compactly,
p∗ = (α− (d− 1)pmin, pmin, . . . , pmin),
by virtue of
∑
p∗i = α = dpmin + α
′.
Case 2. 1− pmin < α′ ≤ 2(1− pmin).
This case follows in an exactly analogous manner as the previous case and leads to
the optimal strategy
p∗ = (1, α− (d− 2)pmin, pmin, . . . , pmin).
Case k. (k − 1)(1− pmin) < α′ ≤ k(1− pmin).
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By generalizing our analysis for the k-th case, written in terms of α as (k − 1)(1 −
pmin)+d pmin < α ≤ k(1−pmin)+d pmin, it is straightforward to check that the optimal
distribution strategy is
p∗ = (1, 1, . . . , α− (d− k)pmin, pmin, . . . , pmin).
Simple algebraic manipulation leads to expression given in the lemma. The derivation




The optimal bid request distribution strategy in Lemma 1 is interpreted as follows.
Given the first condition of our problem (4.1),
∑d
i=1 pi = α, the average number of
DSPs α to which requests will be sent, has to be distributed among the d available
DSPs. According to (4.3) in Lemma 1, the first k−1 DSPs (the ones bidding more and
winning more auctions) are by default sent a bid request; the probability of sending
them the request is 1. The last d − k DSPs (the ones bidding less and winning less
auctions), however, are sent a bid request with a minimum probability pmin according
to the first condition of our revenue-invitation rate function (4.1). Finally, the k-th
DSP is sent a bid request with the remaining probability α − pmin(d − k) − (k − 1).
This strategy can be easily explained as a resource allocation problem where α (the
“resource to be distributed”) is shared among DSPs according to their good behavior,
with the aim of satisfying a given bound α.
Next, we proceed to analyze very briefly some properties of the revenue-invitation
rate function (4.4). It is immediate to check the function is piece-wise linear with
slopes ωkµk. Given that this product will never be negative, neither will be the
slope of R(α) and, consequently, it is easy to see that R(α) is nondecreasing. We
cannot characterize R(α) as increasing because there is the possibility that ωkµk
is zero. Under the same reasoning, it is immediate to check the monotonicity of
this function. Also, from Lemma 1, it is routine to verify the continuity of R on
the interval α ∈ [1, d]. To show the convexity of R(α), note again that for each
k and α ∈ (αk−1, αk], the optimal tradeoff function has slope rk (or wkuk). From
the labeling assumption (4.2), it follows immediately that R(α) is defined by the
decreasing sequence of positive slopes r1, . . . , rd (or w1u1, . . . , wdud) and therefore is
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Figure 4.8: Conceptual plot of the revenue-invitation rate function. R(α) is a nondecreasing function
defined piecewise. From the labeling assumption (4.2), the slopes ofR(α) (ωkµk) decrease as α grows.
concave. Fig. 4.8 conceptually illustrates these properties and the results of Lemma
1.
From the plot in Fig. 4.8 we can observe that the behavior of the DSPs (graphi-
cally depicted through the slopes rk) determines that the losses in revenue of the ad
exchange could be rather low. Namely, the higher the slope rk (i.e., the better the
behavior) of the first DSPs, the faster R(α) approaches the ideal revenue Rmax. This
would entail a more controlled and potentially private bid request distribution (since
fewer DSPs would be involved) while not significantly impacting the revenues of the
advertising ecosystem. The notation used in this chapter is summarized in Table 4.4.
4.4 Experimental Analysis
Next, we empirically evaluate the solution proposed in Sec. 4.3. We describe our ex-
perimental methodology and outline the scenario simulated to reproduce the bidding
process performed by an ad exchange and a set of DSPs. This allows us to investigate
the effect of modifying the bid request distribution model with the aim to enhance
user privacy. Our analysis also contemplates measuring said impact in the revenue of
the ad exchange.
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Since our proposal is to reduce the potential ad buyers to which user data flows,
an impact is expected on the revenue obtained by the online advertising ecosystem
from these bidders. In particular, given the importance of the advertising business
model for the operation of the Internet, we need to show that our proposal does not
significantly affect said business model. Accordingly, when applying our strategy, we
expect a reduction on the revenue for the ad exchange. However, supported by the
optimization approach described in Sec. 4.3.3, we also need to verify that this loss in
income is acceptable in light of the benefits of a more privacy-respectful system(b).
Furthermore, we also verify if, as a result of our multicast solution, the misuse of
RTB systems by some DSPs can be effectively addressed.
4.4.1 Experimental methodology
The proposed solution affects the interaction among an ad exchange and associated
DSPs. Recall from Chapter 2 that DSPs act on behalf of advertisers and thus as
bidders (buyers) in the auctions organized by an ad exchange. In order to invite DSPs
to participate in a given auction and to provide them with the necessary feedback,
the ad exchange distributes bid requests among them, including detailed data about
the user whose impression (and corresponding ad space) shall be auctioned. This
distribution of user data is adjusted in our approach with the objective of preventing
dishonest behaviors of data collection and thus trying to preserve privacy.
To validate our mechanism, we configure an auctioning scenario that reproduces
this behavior, through a Matlab simulation. In this scenario, considering a distribu-
tion control parameter α, an ad exchange enables a number of DSPs to participate
in each auction, while optimizing its revenue. The main elements of this setup are
depicted below.
In our experimental methodology, we simulate real-time auctions in which a variety
of DSP types may bid. In order to deploy a more realistic setup, we consider three
(b)As commented in Sec. 4.1, a great portion of users use ad blockers for privacy reasons. If
the proposed system meets the requirements of these privacy-aware users for some α, the loss in
revenue due to our multicast strategy (instead of the current broadcast approach) may be more than
compensated by the gains of these non-blocking users.
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types of DSPs according to the more likely value of their bids: DSPs bidding high,
low, and average. For each auction, the bids from every DSP are randomly sampled
from a range of values reflecting these behaviors. For our experiments, such bids are
generated following both uniform and Gaussian distributions.
After bids are generated probabilistically at every time instant, an ad exchange
instance holds an auction and determines the winner DSP (the one with the highest
bid). In line with our privacy proposal, for every auction, not all available DSPs are
“invited”, i.e., not all DSPs are sent bid requests, but a number of them, according
to the parameter α. Thus, the corresponding activation of DSPs to participate in
every auction is enabled by the optimized distribution strategy defined in (4.3). The
strategy depends on two parameters specific to the historical operation (behavior) of
each DSP (winning bid rate, and average money spent) and on the privacy parameter
α defined by design. Consistently, said parameters of each DSP are calculated before
an auction to be used as a kind of reputation metric that fuels the private bid request
distribution strategy. Figure 4.7 depicts this methodology implemented through a
simulation using Matlab R2017a.
After simulating one thousand auctions, we compute the total revenue of the ad
exchange by summing all the money effectively spent by the bidders that won at every
time instant.
To evaluate if our approach is feasible, we need to examine to which extent it may
impact the ad exchange’s revenue, which turns to reflect the revenue of the whole
advertising ecosystem. Recall that online advertising is said to be supporting the
current Internet free business model. Thus, at least for now, this kind of solutions
should not significantly tamper with the current ad distribution model since it could
negatively affect the economy of online advertising platforms.
4.4.2 Results
We set up a scenario with twenty DSPs: seven bidding high, seven bidding low,
and six bidding between high and low (an average value). Then we simulate an ad
exchange instance holding a thousand auctions. Our distribution control strategy is
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Figure 4.9: Number of bid requests (invitations to DSPs) sent per auction for our experiment, with
α = 8.
enforced with pmin = 0.05 and with α = 8. That is to say, to prevent abuses and
preserve privacy, bid requests are distributed among eight DSPs in average (those
with better behavior) and not among the twenty available. Furthermore, a minimum
of 5% of bid requests are distributed among these eight DSPs in order to guarantee
all them will participate at some point.
In Fig. 4.9 we represent the number of DSPs, out of the 20 available, that partic-
ipate in each auction of our experiments. As expected, this histogram confirms that
the number of DSPs participating per auction is 8 in average (the value of α).
Then, we also use Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.11 to characterize the participating DSPs in
terms of the rate of won auctions (ω) and the average money spent (µ), respectively.
These parameters are measured at every auction, with respect to all the previous
auctions. We depict the values to describe the behavior of three DSPs, one from
each category. Evidently, these figures show how DSPs with a more desired behavior
(bidding higher or spending more) present better indicators ω and µ.
Additionally, we assess the effects of our mechanism on the revenue of the ad
exchange. For this, we perform a set of experiments using different values for the
parameter α, from 1 to 20 (i.e., we simulated a round of 1000 auctions for each value
of α). As α represents the average number of DSPs to which bid requests are sent
from the ad exchange, the results from our experiments reveal the impact of the
value of this parameter on the total revenue obtained. This impact is illustrated in
Fig. 4.12, for the two different strategies for generating bid requests (uniform and
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Figure 4.10: Rate of won bids for different DSPs behaviors in our experiment. We use α = 8 and
λ = 0.05
Figure 4.11: Average money spent according to different DSPs behaviors in our experiment. We use
α = 8 and λ = 0.05.
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Figure 4.12: Revenue obtained by the system for different values of α. For these experiments we use
λ = 0.05 and a set of 20 DSPs so we make α vary from 1 to 20. Experiments are made following
two different random distributions when generating the bid requests: (a) uniform and (b) Gaussian.
Gaussian distributions). First, note how the revenue increases with the value of α,
consistently with the tradeoff commented in Sec. 4.3 and depicted in the conceptual
plot in Fig. 4.8. In addition, when α = 20, the maximum revenue is reached because,
in practice, no control mechanism is applied when all the available DSPs are activated
to receive bid requests. Remarkably enough, the revenue when α = 8 and onwards
is pretty close to the revenue when α = 20. Actually, in those cases, revenue is
less than 1% lower than the maximum obtained when our strategy is not applied.
The importance of this result lies in that the bid request distribution control enables
certain privacy guarantees that can be enforced while having a very small impact
on the ad exchange’s economic benefit. The results observed in these experiments,
however, are certainly tied to the specific behaviors assumed for the DSPs. As a
matter of fact, our theoretical analysis of the trade-off between revenue and data
distribution control found that R(α) depends on the sequence of slopes ωi µi. The
higher the slopes of the first DSPs (sorted according to (4.2)), the fewer the average
number of DSPs needed to obtain revenues close to Rmax. On the extreme, the case
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ωiµi = ωjµj for all i, j = 1, . . . , d yields a straight line, which represents the worst
scenario in terms of ad revenue.
Finally, we are interested in seeing how our parameter α is capable of regulating
the behavior of DSPs. For this, we conduct an experiment with a setup of 3 DSPs,
each behaving differently (bidding high, low and average). We simulate a thousand
auctions and apply our privacy mechanisms for different values of α, from 1 to 3. We
measure the rate r of won auctions with respect to the requests (invitations) received
by each DSP from the ad exchange. This rate could be interpreted as a measure of
the goodness of the behavior of DSPs as stated in Sec. 4.3. A DSP bidding higher
shall win more bids and spend more money. Accordingly, the higher the rate of won
bids, the more desirable is the behavior of a DSP. Conversely, r could also be seen
as a measure of the abuse committed by a DSP against the privacy of a user, since a
low rate of won auctions (low r) would entail a DSP receiving user data information
without paying for it.
The results of this experiments are illustrated in Fig. 4.13 and Fig. 4.14, where
we depict the evolution of the rate of won auctions of different types of DSPs. Re-
spectively, we plot the results obtained from using two different strategies to generate
bid requests (uniform and Gaussian) for each type of DSP. First note that, in this
context, α = 20 represents the case where the ad exchange sends bid requests to all
available DSPs, so there is no control strategy applied. In this case, we see that DSPs
bidding low have low rates of won auctions, which would imply that they are taking
advantage of the advertising system. However, if we analyze the value of this rate as
α decreases, we observe that the rate r increases for each type of DSP, which suggests
a successful adjustment of the behavior of DSPs. In general, thus, it makes sense
to maximize the benefits of the ad exchange subject to a restriction by distribution
control (privacy) since the rates of won bids shall improve for small α.
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Figure 4.13: Evolution of the rate of won auctions for different values of α (from 1 to 20 in steps of
0.5) and λ = 0.05. We consider 20 DSPs with different behaviors (bidding high, average and low).
For each value of α, we repeat the experiment 20 times. The results are depicted averaged in (a)
for each type of DSP. In (b), we illustrate results of percentiles 3 (using ’+’), 50 (using ’*’) and 97
(using ’’). For these experiments, bid requests for the different types of DSPs are generated using
a uniform distribution.
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Figure 4.14: Evolution of the rate of won auctions for different values of α (from 1 to 20 in steps of
0.5) and λ = 0.05. We consider 20 DSPs with different behaviors (bidding high, average and low).
For each value of α, we repeat the experiment 20 times. The results are depicted averaged in (a)
for each type of DSP. In (b), we illustrate results of percentiles 3 (using ’+’), 50 (using ’∗’) and 97




The big picture of privacy in the online advertising ecosystem
The “hyperconnection” of people to the Internet is making them widely traceable by
the providers of third-party applications that enable the collection of personal data.
Among such providers we find online advertising platforms, which might be building
a mass surveillance structure due to several reasons. First, the presence of advertising
online is so massive that both the tracking of users and the collection of their data
are real-time and ongoing processes. Namely, personal data is continuosly leaked to
the advertising infrastructure as users browse the Web.
Besides, in this same direction, we have verified that the reach of advertising en-
tities is pretty wide. It is a fact that advertisements “follow us” wherever we surf
the Internet. As a consequence, user information is regularly processed in bulk and
indiscriminately, always in the name of greater personalization. Furthermore, the
user information ceded to third parties during ad auctions is extremely granular.
This facilitates identification of users, e.g., by using identifying attributes (such as
IP addresses) or combining them to build a fingerprint. Due to granularity, not only
identification is feasible, but also other privacy attacks derived from the type of in-
formation released. For instance, variations in location data along with IP address
changes could unveil user movement patterns. Also, information about sites visited
may reveal the interests and behavior of users. Finally, these practices of ubiquitous
tracking and aggregation of granular user information is largely concentrated in en-
tities over which little control is enforced. Sadly, this concentration of the power of
surveillance is not only affecting the privacy of many users but it is turning advertising
entities into dangerous means of massive manipulation, as exemplified in [146].
This scenario, which is less and less encouraging for privacy, is made worse by
the lack of transparency in the sharing of user information among the participating
entities. Hence, users are unaware of the complex dynamics behind the advertising
ecosystem and the particular privacy risks they are facing online. And so forth, partly
motivated by some creepy perceptions regarding online behavioral advertising [69],
people are increasingly using ad blockers. Whilst emerged to undermine abusive
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tracking from advertisers, ad blockers bear an interesting concept in giving users a
more active role in the advertising ecosystem. This role might consist in providing
users with more transparency and radical control over ads. However, very little can
be really done if abusive behaviors that exacerbate privacy risks are ignored within
the core of advertising platforms.
The privacy risk derived from user data sharing
One of the abusive behaviors that threat privacy in the online advertising ecosystem
involves the malicious collection of bid requests by DSPs and related third parties
who, violating the terms of service defined by ad exchanges, may be participating
in auctions without any interest in winning. This is possible due to the oversending
(broadcasting) of bid requests including personal data to DSPs, which is motivated
by the need for an ad exchange to maximize profit.
Regulating bid request distribution as a mechanism to pre-
serve privacy
Our contribution to address this issue consists in enabling some control over a crucial
part of the advertising ecosystem: the bid request distribution model to DSPs and
similar intermediaries. In this line, our experimental results show that reducing the
number of DSPs recipients in online advertising through regulating such distribution
may virtually cause no losses in revenue for the ad exchange. Particularly, the higher
the value of the parameter ri (product of the rate of won bids and average money
spent) for the DSPs with better behavior, the less DSPs need to be contacted to
reach the maximum revenue; thus, personal information would be shared among less
third parties. Consequently, based on this control strategy, DSPs are encouraged
to correct their behavior since, otherwise, their chances of participating and win-
ning in ad auctions fall significantly. Despite the small losses in revenue, we state
that win/win outcomes are reached for the interests of ad exchanges (revenue) and
end users (privacy) since actively regulating the behavior of third parties regarding
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user privacy could significantly discourage harmful attitudes of users towards online
advertising (e.g., massively using ad blockers).
Unlike other approaches to preserve privacy in online advertising, which contem-
plate significant modifications in the ecosystem, a great added value is provided by
ours since it entails a minimum change in the bid request distribution strategy, while
leaving the main online advertising infrastructure untouched, albeit personal informa-
tion is still ceded to third parties. This should be a great incentive for ad exchanges to
adopt this kind of mechanisms in order to regulate the behavior of associated agencies
and to take additional steps to protect the privacy of end users.
Interestingly, our approach could be extended to complement transparency and
control enabled in the user side through an interface, e.g., the one offered by an
ad blocker plugin such as Adblock Plus. First, an ad exchange implementing our
bid request distribution model might provide users (through this user interface) with
the value of α, i.e., the number of entities with which their personal data has been
shared (transparency). Furthermore, as a privacy mechanism, the browser plugin
could enable users to configure a maximum number of entities with which to share
their data (informed decision). Accordingly, if the user data results to be shared with
more entities in average, the plugin would block the corresponding ads (control).
In the same line of reducing the potential adversaries to protect privacy, an im-
provement of our approach could be targeted auctioning. This would consist in parti-
tioning our optimization problem to be solved on a per-market basis, i.e., auctioning
a user impression only among the DSPs subscribed to a given targeting market. Said
otherwise, the specific targets of a DSP at a moment in time could serve as another
reputation parameter when the ad exchange auctions a user impression.
Appealing to a change in the bid request distribution model, in the core of the
advertising ecosystem, entails a big step towards enforcing privacy in this context;
more if the impact of such strategy can be minimized. As depicted in the previous
paragraph, although bringing some controlled loss in revenue, our proposal may sug-
gest a paradigm shift with a multiplicative effect for the benefit of user privacy. Not
only is activated a technology for ad exchanges to support privacy regulation, but
part of the control can be given to users. And further, this approach could serve
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to alleviate the harmful tensions between advertising systems and users provoked by
serious concerns regarding privacy.
Privacy protection with our system
The extent to which our mechanism could protect privacy may also be subject to
discussion. Whereas the level of privacy provided by some mechanisms could be
quantitatively measured under certain assumptions, whether the given protection is
sufficient or not is pretty relative. This is because, in general, the level of privacy
provided by any protection mechanism depends on the context, and in our case, it
is defined by the requirements set in Sec. 4.3.1, the adversary model from Sec. 4.1.1,
and the strategy proposed in Sec. 4.3.2. In this specific framework, our solution could
provide great privacy by enabling an ad exchange to strongly support privacy without
significantly affecting the revenue of the system. However, the ultimate level of privacy
provided would depend on the particular strategy adopted by the ad exchange (either,
e.g., aggressive, capping a lot the participation of DSPs; or moderate, not restricting
it significantly).
Beyond this limited scenario, other players might still disclose user information,
e.g., first parties (publishers), ISPs, data brokers, etc. However, the scope of action
of ad exchanges is by far greater. Since DSPs may illegitimately benefit from such
capabilities, extremely reducing the amount of DSPs participating in auctions, e.g.,
to a dozen, would improve privacy to a similar extent.
In any case, ours is a first approach to dealing with privacy issues in this par-
ticular context where user data may be inappropriately shared to dishonest DSPs.
Interestingly enough, future work might concentrate on giving users further control
capabilities focused on modulating the privacy parameter introduced in this strategy.
Thus, if provided with some background information, users themselves would be able
to choose the privacy level they feel comfortable with.
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Incentives to adopt regulated data distribution
Unlike most proposals to protect privacy in the online advertising ecosystem, ours
aims to encourage advertising players (mainly ad exchanges) to adopt it for the benefit
of users and ad platforms. In this subsection, we describe the main incentives that
these entities would have to implement the mechanism presented in this chapter.
• Privacy regulations require more and more control from data controllers and
processors over user data collection, use, and distribution [65]. Furthermore,
the heavy fines for neglecting user privacy are pushing these entities to adopt
protection mechanisms, especially when they manage user data at a massive
scale [147]. Since pur approach aims at the more private distribution of user
data at a relatively low cost, we think that ad exchanges would be strongly
motivated to adopt it.
• Not only regulation is urging the advertising ecosystem to endorse privacy pro-
tection initiatives, the current ad blocker arms race [148] is empowering users
to protect themselves through radical mechanisms that might be affecting the
economic health of the advertising players. In such a conflictive environment, it
seems reasonable for these actors, especially those in the core network, to start
to give in to the users’ legitimate expectations of privacy. Otherwise, the war
would grow fiercer, seriously affecting not only the online advertising business
model but that of the entire Internet.
• The implementation of the distribution mechanism we propose would not in-
volve significant changes to the online advertising ecosystem. The ad exchange
would only have to incorporate a module to distribute bid requests among the
“best behaved” bidders for a given context (privacy parameter, targeting mar-
ket, etc.). The rest of entities would remain unchanged.
• Even though our approach does not tamper with the current online advertising
model, it might generate a regulation effect over DSPs. That is, in order to avoid
penalization, DSPs would not adhere to dishonest practices when participating
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in auctions. Interestingly, this value-added service could further improve the
system’s revenues.
• As it has already happened with other privacy-enhancing initiatives (e.g., Face-
book’s ad preferences), ours opens the door to the implementation of further
transparency and control mechanisms for users. Our mechanism would encour-
age those ad exchanges committed to respect user privacy to create interfaces
for users to examine or even modulate the privacy parameter we are introducing
here.
• Beyond its technical implications, ad exchanges would be highly encouraged to
implement our proposal in order to compensate users for the opacity behind
which the exploitation of their data has been hiding. The scandals surrounding
the abuse of user information undermine daily the reputation of the advertising
ecosystem and hence the trust of end users, the ultimate owners of data (the
main input of the online advertising ecosystem). Upon realizing that specific
controls are being implemented to protect their privacy, their concerns could
be alleviated, since their main concern is not the sharing of information itself,
but the inappropriate sharing of their information [13]. Consequently, users
themselves could even decide not to block the tracking of privacy-compliant ad
exchanges, which is a further incentive for the latter to adopt our mechanism.
4.6 Conclusions
Undoubtedly, the main privacy concerns regarding online advertising come from the
great capability of third parties to aggregate user data. Due to the inherent opacity of
this ecosystem, the most known approaches to face such concerns build on radical ad
blocking solutions. By entirely blocking ads and partly stopping the leakage of data
from the user side, these radical approaches are threatening the current economic
model of the Web. On the other hand, with the aim of balancing the trade-off
between revenue and the number of invited DSPs (looking for more user privacy), we
propose to modify part of the ad delivery model. Our technique arises as a strategy
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of bid request suppression where interactions carrying user data can be reduced, by
design, to offer more privacy, while slightly affecting the revenue of the system. More
specifically, we come up with a controlled distribution of bid requests among DSPs in
order to reduce the amount of user data shared with said third parties. Nevertheless,
our approach comes at the expense of revenue loss incurred by lowering the number of
participants within ad auctions. Since this technique would be applied directly in the
core of ad platforms, more overwhelming and less harmful results could be obtained.
Part of our effort lies on an analysis of the privacy risks involved in the massive
aggregation of data performed by some online advertising entities. In this line, we
strove to characterize the personal information leaked in bidding interactions and
some of the derived critical jeopardies. We concentrate on bid request messages that
are used to invite DSPs to participate in ad auctions and that carry very granular
information about the user online behavior. Thus, using a publicly available data set
belonging to a famous chinese DSP, we unveil the potential capability of advertising
intermediaries to do massive surveillance even at a very low cost. Accordingly, we
also highlight the power given to advertisers to microtarget users with a very fine
precision.
Our main outcome is a mathematical approach to tackle the aforementioned prob-
lem of distributing bid requests to less DSPs, while minimally affecting the revenue
of the system. We formulate and solve an optimization problem that seeks to maxi-
mize the revenue while bounding the participation of DSPs. Thus privacy is enforced
through balancing this revenue-invitation rate trade-off.
As a result of our theoretical analysis, we present a close-form solution for the bid
request distribution strategy and a revenue-invitation rate function characterizing
the optimal trade-off curve. From this analysis, we find an interesting opportunity
to cap the number of DSPs that receive bid requests while maintaining a reasonable
revenue. From simulations perfomed over an auctioning scenario, we confirm that the
revenue of the system indeed increases with the number of DSPs participating in each
auction. However, we find that even when drastically reducing this number (thus,
increasing privacy of users) an important portion of revenue may still be preserved.
Also, it turns out useful to maximize revenue subject to a restriction that supports
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privacy when handing out bid requests, because it leads DSPs to behave better (e.g.,
increasing their rate of won bids), driven by a penalization on abusing the system






Personalized online advertising is responsible for much of the online tracking per-
formed over users. Online advertising platforms are supported by sophisticated per-
sonalization systems that tailor ad content according to the preferences of users; these
preferences are learned from the information collected by tracking. In this line, the
more information is collected, the better the performance of personalization systems,
and the higher the profits of the advertising platforms. Since online advertising has
become a millionaire business [149] that apparently supports the very existence of
the Internet [150], there is a great motivation from multiple instances to collect more
and more data, which implies massifying and improving online tracking.
Online tracking refers to the activity of closely following a user wherever she
”goes” while browsing the Web. This is possible because users leave innumerable
footprints online, without even noticing it, when requesting for content to websites.
IP address, operating system, browser type, plugins installed, patches applied, and
browsing history are some examples of (context) information leaked in a single HTTP
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request. If aggregated and processed, said information could serve to build user
profiles revealing location, shopping habits, entertainment preferences and even the
gender of users.
With the involvement of so much user information, online tracking raises serious
privacy concerns. The information collected may be so varied and detailed (e.g.,
location, interests, voting preferences) and the technology used so specialized that
tracking may enable external entities to characterize a significant part of a user’s life.
Furthermore, state data is currently being collected, due to a real-time mechanism
that binds online tracking with every single user web request, enabling third parties
(not only Internet providers) to literally monitor each of the user “movements” on
the Web.
In this attacker scenario, the first potential tracker is thus the website (publisher)
that the user visits, as described in Sec. 3.2.1. Thus, if tracking is performed from
the publisher, it is called first-party tracking. In general, the audiences of first parties
are pretty segmented, so the user tracking they might perform is usually innocuous.
Some exceptions are the ’walled gardens’ built by the Internet giants (e.g., Facebook),
which concentrate services for millions of users within a single ecosystem.
Furthermore, a single user web request commonly triggers connections from the
user browser to several third parties that receive part of the aforementioned contextual
information. This information is used by third-parties to support real-time services
such as personalized advertising or other services for websites, e.g., media hosting
(by content distribution networks), load balancing, or social networking. Figure 5.1
illustrates the interactions triggered by a user browser request, which enable first and
third-party tracking.
Undoubtedly, better online services are provided thanks to personalization and
outsourcing; however, third party tracking supports the massive aggregation of user
information (collected along multiple sites along the Web) in the hands of anyone
aiming at paying for it [23]. The online activity of users is then monitored and
processed by several entities that users had never heard of. Figure 5.2 illustrates the
large number of connections to third parties (information flows) derived when a user









ad and tracking services
Figure 5.1: Requests to third parties (3) triggered by a single HTTP user request (1). When a user
browses a webiste, a redirection command is commonly sent in the HTTP response (2) to spawn
further connections to third parties.
Figure 5.2: Illustration of the multiple connections to third parties (more than 50) generated in the
background after visiting only 3 sites. The points where connections originate represent the websites
while the little triangles represent the third parties contacted. This figure was obtained through the
browser extension Disconnect [1].
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Unlike physical user tracking, e.g., in a street, online tracking is much less evident
for users because it is performed on the background of web browsing. Unfortunately,
there is very little evidence available for users to realize the latent pervasiveness of
online tracking.
Due to its prevalence on the Web, measuring online tracking could be a way to
characterize the privacy risks of Internet users. The severity of said risks may be illus-
trated through different indicators such as the level of exposition of user interactions
to third parties, the concentration of user information on a few advertising companies,
the dynamic behavior of tracking for websites belonging to certain categories, or the
suspicious requests to third parties triggered when accessing government web sites.
While related work [81] has performed more general approaches by studying online
tracking through the most popular sites of the Web, our analysis in this chapter
was mainly devoted to assess the online tracking and advertising triggered by local
websites, in particular those from Iberoamerican countries. Moreover, our effort was
oriented to find out how the location of users and the type of publishers impact
on the online tracking and advertising interactions and, thus, how on the potential
privacy risks. Since most related research has focused on top-world, American, or
European sites, probably, other aspects not addressed in said work will arise from
the work presented in this chapter. We are interested in a very heterogeneous region
such as Latin America (LATAM) and its contrast with the European Union (EU),
e.g., in terms of the adoption of modern personalization systems (including online
advertising) or the maturity of user perceptions regarding privacy.
Our assessment was also based on taking advantage of the ads.txt standard,
increasingly being adopted by websites for some years now. ads.txt is a project
promoted by the Internet Advertising Bureau (IAB) to increase transparency in the
programmatic advertising ecosystem and prevent fraud. It encourages publishers to
publicly inform the companies they have authorized to sell their advertising inventory
(ad spaces). Such publication is done through a text file (so much like the robots.txt
standard) called ads.txt in the root context of the website. Interestingly, revealing
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such information could also serve as a transparency mechanism for users so we col-
lected and processed the content of this file to confirm the results obtained when
crawling third-party tracking.
The work presented in this chapter is related to that published in [18].
Chapter outline
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the methodol-
ogy followed in this work, including data collection, processing, and experiments. Sec-
tion 5.3 presents the results of measuring online tracking and advertising in Iberoamer-
ica. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Sec. 5.4.
5.2 Experimental Methodology
We study the impact of online tracking and advertising in Iberoamerica by measuring
the third-party traffic triggered when browsing websites in this region. In the next
subsections we explain how the data related to this traffic was generated, collected
and processed. Also we describe which countries and websites were involved in this
analysis. More importantly, we briefly describe the tests performed to study the
privacy risks in this particular context.
5.2.1 Selection and Categorization of Websites
Selection of Websites
Since the context of our study builds on Iberoamerica, we first selected the countries
whose websites would be considered for our tests. Thus, we selected the countries in
this region that allowed us a VPN connection so that web traffic could be generated
from such locations. This included Spain and Portugal from EU and the following
LATAM countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mex-
ico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For some tests involving web traffic directed to
LATAM, we also included other countries.
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Next we dedicated to obtain the most popular websites within each of the afore-
mentioned countries. For this, we manually selected only the local websites from the
top 500 ranking published for each country by the Alexa Top Sites service offered by
Amazon [151]. For other experiments, we also collected the top 500 global websites
also using this service as source. In a nutshell, our experimental scenario consisted of
12 countries, 2,076 Iberoamerican websites and 500 top-world websites.
Categorization of Websites
With the aim of understanding the influence of the content published in websites on
the phenomena studied in this work, we also labeled each website tested according
such content. We manually categorized each of the websites, with the support of the
Site Safety Center tool of Trend Micro [152].
5.2.2 Data collection
The data we studied mainly included all the third-party requests spawned after vis-
iting a website. Assessing the magnitude of such traffic, the destination third-parties
participating, and even the tracking information they may set in the user side (cook-
ies), may help to unveil the inherent privacy risks of users browsing these sites.
Our experiments involved simulating websites visits to trigger third-party traffic.
For the thousands of websites in our scenario, we performed this (including data
collection) automatically through OpenWPM, a very versatile tool devoted to web
measurement [81]. OpenWPM offers a programmable interface to orchestrate the
main functions of a web browser, thus allowing automated web crawling and collection
of tracking-related information (redirects, cookies and third-party calls) that is stored
in a SQLite database. This tool was also used to obtain, if existing, a particular file
from websites, to study the adoption of the ads.txt advertising standard.
5.2.3 Experiments
We performed several tests simulating web traffic from different countries in Iberoamer-
ica, given our particular interest in studying potential privacy risks derived from the
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location of users when browsing sites in this region. As suggested previously, we
used a VPN service to connect to each of said countries and send web traffic to local
websites.
First, we generated local traffic, i.e., visits from each country to websites in the
same country. Furthermore, we simulated visits from (a country in) EU to websites
in LATAM countries. This way we tried to detect different effects when the same
publishers are visited from diverse locations. But a particular website, especially if
widely popular, seems an important parameter of third-party traffic too. Thus, for the
sake of comparison, we also experimented simulating web traffic from Iberoamerican
countries to top-world sites.
Through OpenWPM we collected information on the third-party requests trig-
gered by simulated user browsing, and on added third-party cookies set on the user
side. From said data, we also measured advertising related requests, which, associated
with a personalized service, may imply higher privacy risks. To measure the dynam-
ics of advertising interactions, we classified third-party requests as ad related or not,
by resorting to available libraries that, based on ad blocking lists [54], facilitate the
detection of such type of traffic.
We aimed at finding privacy risks by measuring the intensity of third-party traffic
(including ad related interactions) and counting the number of entities behind such
traffic, and the cookies set in the browser. Third-party traffic, measured as the mean
number of third party requests triggered from websites, is a first approach to unveil
potential privacy issues. The greater the indirect and non-consensual traffic from
users the more user information would be released through such flows. In the same
line, we obtained the number of third-parties receiving said traffic as a proxy to
the number of potential third-party trackers. We also counted the mean number of
cookies set by third-parties, and particularly those cookies more likely to be related
to user pseudo-identifiers. Since online tracking tightly depends on this information,
measuring this parameter contributed to our objective of finding privacy risks.
To ascertain the impact of the type of content served by publishers on the inten-
sity of third-party tracking, we tabulated the information collected according to the
categories of websites. Since the consumers of certain (categories of) content might
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Figure 5.3: Heat map illustrating the mean number of third-party requests triggered from local
traffic in Iberoamerican countries.
be more relevant in economic terms, the sites associated with such content might be
more exposed to third-party tracking and privacy risks.
Finally, trying to confirm some of the findings when studying third-party tracking,
we collected the records in ads.txt files from Iberoamerican publishers where this
file was present. From the data obtained, we studied the adoption of this standard




In Fig. 5.3, we illustrate the impact of third-party traffic triggered by browsing
Iberoamerican web sites locally, i.e., from each country. Such map representation en-
ables to illustrate the geography, size, and potential population of involved countries.
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This perspective reveals the marked heterogeneity not only among Latin American
countries, but particularly among them and EU countries (here represented by Spain
and Portugal).
A lot of traffic towards third-parties is observed in this context. Besides the great
number of third-party requests triggered in general by a single visit to publishers,
we evidence that such traffic is not homogeneous along countries. It stands out that
this traffic within some large and populated countries, such as Brazil and Peru, has a
lower impact than that in Portugal and Spain, although the latter are much smaller
and less populated. On the other hand, Argentina, Mexico, and Chile do show an
important number of third-party requests spawned by local traffic.
Beyond the disparity in Latin American countries, European publishers and users
seem to be more attractive targets for third-party tracking. This might imply a higher
risk for such users since more entities and more personal information would be in-
volved. However, many of these third-party requests could have the same destination,
so it is convenient to identify the recipient entities (third-party trackers) by filtering
the domain names from their destination URLs. As noted above, insofar these entities
receive so much indirect user traffic, they might become attackers, not only against
user privacy but also against user security.
As commented in Sec. 5.1, the number of third-party domains behind online
tracking may better reflect a potential privacy attack scenario since it could serve as
a proxy of the number of third-party entities collecting information (third-party track-
ers). As depicted in Fig. 5.4, hundreds of entities were found receiving third-party
requests, indirectly, from users, when locally visiting Iberoamerican sites. European
countries had a very similar number of potential third-party trackers while in Latin
America the situation is less uniform. In Brazil and Mexico, by far the most popu-
lated countries, we found the greatest number of third-party entities. However, we
think the difference with other countries is certainly minor, considering the variation
in population.
One might think that websites in a country of hundreds of millions of citizens,
such as Brazil, would spawn much more third-party traffic than those in a country
with a couple of tens of millions (e.g., Chile, Spain, and particularly Portugal), but
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Figure 5.4: Number of third-party domains contacted as a result of local traffic within Iberoamerican
countries.
the difference is not as marked as the population. There might be some reasons.
First, it could reflect a preference of potential trackers to certain type of population.
However, third-party requests are also generated by technology services, e.g., content
distribution, commonly used by publishers. Thus, more entities behind third-party
traffic could also indicate more tech supporting websites. In any case, there would be
more privacy risk for a user if he is targeted in a small population than in a big one.
By weighting the number of third-party domains by the population of countries
(in millions of inhabitants) as shown in Fig. 5.5, we tried to capture the latter effect.
We can see in this figure that, despite being very sparsely populated, Costa Rica,
Uruguay, and Portugal spawn a lot of third-party traffic. Despite its size, these
are relative rich countries, in particular when compared with the average in Latin
America, which we think could explain this behavior to some extent. Paradoxically,
richer countries are more prone to implementing strong privacy legislation, which in
this context does not seem to discourage third-party traffic. Note that this behavior
is measured when crawling local sites of each country from the same country.
Trying to identify third-party tracking, and specifically personal data leaking,
another interesting indicator might be the mean number of third-party cookies set





































































Figure 5.5: Number of third-party domains contacted as a result of local traffic, weighted by popu-
lation, within Iberoamerican countries.
in the user’s browser. Recall from Sec. 3.2.2 that third-party cookies may be used
to transport user identifiers that online trackers employ to recognize a user when she
visits a publisher. This way, a tracker is able to “follow” users and associate informa-
tion to their profiles. We cataloged these cookies as tracking cookies or identifying
cookies (ID cookies) if their lengths were greater than 6 as done in previous works.
When processing the data obtained from local traffic within Iberoamerican coun-
tries, we found that a user browsing local sites from Portugal would receive 14 ID
cookies on average, as depicted in Fig. 5.6. Spain, Argentina, and Colombia follow
with 8 ID cookies on average. This figure shows that this number varies along the
different countries but suggests a great interest of Portuguese local sites in tracking
local users.
Since we categorized each of the publishers visited along our experiments, we
could represent in Fig. 5.7 the potential influence of the content delivered by pub-
lishers on the tracking performed over users. As shown in other works, news/media,
entertainment, and shopping/travel are the categories concentrating more third-
party tracking, in this case when local traffic is studied in Iberoamerican countries.
Some particularities should be noted about some countries: users from Costa Rica
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Figure 5.6: Mean number of identifying third-party cookies found as result of local traffic within
Iberoamerican countries.
would be receiving a lot of third-party tracking triggered by education and govern-
ment sites; and, from Brazil, would occur the same with weather.
As a consequence, some of these categories may entail more privacy risks than oth-
ers. For instance, education could involve audiences including children or teenagers
who are clearly more vulnerable to abuse, more if the sites belonging to these category
require any kind of login. Also, probably, government sites should not be tracking
their citizens, even worse to “profit” from their interactions if coupled, e.g. with
advertising platforms.
When comparing traffic to LATAM originated locally vs. from EU, traffic from
EU spawns, in general, more third-party requests per website as shown in Fig. 5.8.
Namely, when traffic originates in EU, more third-party interactions are observed in
most of LATAM countries. Chile is the exception.
Although the intensity of third-party traffic is higher for web browsing from EU
than internally in LATAM, the total number of domains or entities behind third-
party traffic is very similar, no matter where the web traffic originates, as depicted
in Fig. 5.9. The same entities would be involved in third-party traffic but changing
the tracking strategy depending on the location of the user.

























































































Figure 5.7: Mean number of ID third-party cookies set from local traffic within Iberoamerican
























































trafic from EU to LATAM
traffic within LATAM countries
Figure 5.8: Mean number of third-party requests triggered by web traffic from EU to LATAM.
120

























































traffic from EU to LATAM
traffic within LATAM countries
Figure 5.9: Total number of third-party domains found behind web traffic from EU to LATAM.
It is still compelling that very small countries such as Uruguay and Costa Rica
might be tracked by a lot of entities despite their small population. When weighting
such number of third-party domains by the population of countries, as illustrated in
Fig. 5.10, this detail is evidenced. On the other hand, note how huge and highly
populated countries such as Brazil and Mexico show an opposite phenomenon: a
relatively small number of third-party entities. This again characterizes a marked
heterogeneity in the Latin American context, where tiny populations might become
the target of several external entities. Naturally, individuals in such groups would be
more exposed to privacy risks than those in larger groups.
For some countries, the number of identifying cookies is slightly greater when web
requests are generated locally (Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru) than when
coming from EU, although in Chile such number is double (see Fig. 5.11). The
opposite occurs in the rest of the countries (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay).
The inherent potential tracking, then, varies from country to country and apparently
regardless its origin is EU or LATAM. Probably, in this regard, a more individualized
study should be developed to unveil the reasons of this behavior.
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Figure 5.11: Mean number of third-party ID cookies found behind web traffic from EU to LATAM.
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Figure 5.12: Mean number of third-party requests triggered by web traffic to top-world sites.
When testing web traffic from Iberoamerican countries to the top-world sites, we
found out in Fig. 5.12 that the number of derived third-party requests seems to be,
in general, stable along all the countries analyzed. Interestingly, the same effect is
shown when illustrating in Fig. 5.13 the total number of third-party domains behind
such interactions. Note, however, that this number of entities is almost ten times
greater than that when the web traffic was directed to local sites.
The behavior of third-party tracking may be significantly more aggressive when
visiting globally popular sites, no matter the source of such visits. Thus, in this
scenario, the relative impact on small countries such us Costa Rica, Uruguay and
Portugal might be greater given its small population.
The mean number of identifying cookies set when visiting top-world sites from
Iberoamerica is also homogeneous along the countries tested. This number is certainly
greater than when web traffic is directed to LATAM countries, despite the number
of entities behind is ten times higher. That the number of potential tracking cookies
does not grow as significantly as the number of third-party domains may suggest that
widely popular websites could be also resorting to other more sophisticated tracking
mechanisms.






























































Figure 5.13: Total number of third-party domains found behind web traffic to top-world sites.
The mean number of identifying cookies set when visiting top-world sites from
Iberoamerica is also homogeneous along the countries tested. This number is certainly
greater than when web traffic is directed to LATAM countries, despite the number
of entities behind is ten times higher. That the number of potential tracking cookies
does not grow as significantly as the number of third-party domains may suggest that
widely popular websites could be also resorting to other more sophisticated tracking
mechanisms.
Finally, as shown in Fig. 5.14, news/media and shopping/travel were again
the categories spawning more third-party tracking when browsing top-world sites.
Since a wider spectrum of sites was covered in this experiment, other categories were
also relevant in terms of potential tracking such as weather, lottery and health.
Regarding privacy risks, note how, in this context, sites potentially serving, collecting
and even sharing very sensitive information (health or pornography) could be the
source of intense third-party tracking.
In any case, gateways of information such as digital newspapers or sites involving
any kind of commerce are those spawning a great deal of tracking, either because of
their big audiences or because user willingness to buy in these sites is high, no matter
where users are located.
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Figure 5.14: Mean number of ID third-party cookies set by web traffic to top-world sites, from
Iberoamerican countries, organized by category of publisher.
5.3.2 Online Advertising
Analysis through the ads.txt standard
In Fig. 5.15, the adoption of the standard ads.txt is depicted. Longer curves such
as those of Portugal and Spain indicate that more websites host this file including
the ad exchanges authorized to sell ad spaces from said websites. The figure shows
that the adoption of ads.txt in Latin American countries is still reduced compared
to the countries analyzed in the EU. Only Brazil and Argentina present similar levels
of adoption. In any case, the number of records per website goes from 1 to 150 for
most countries. The specific domains involved are studied below.
To show how third-party entities are distributed along websites in Iberoamerica,
based on the records found in the ads.txt files, we first plotted Fig. 5.16. This
ECDF shows that 1% of the third-party domains found appear on more than 20%
of the websites crawled (more than 70% of the sites hosting an ads.txt). Thus, the
concentration of advertising in a few entities is evident in this context; to give an
example, google.com were engaged with all the sites that had adopted this standard,
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Figure 5.15: Number of records in ads.txt files found in websites of Iberoamerican countries.
and 4 others (rubicon, appnexus, openx and pubmatic) were engaged with more
than 70% of the sites that had an ads.txt file.
When analyzing websites by category in Table 5.1, we found that ads.txt is widely
adopted by news/media sites, followed by entertainment and shopping/travel, as
it happened with third-party tracking. Besides, in Table 5.2, we depict the mean num-
ber of third-party domains identified within ads.txt files. Although, a few education
related publishers were found that have adopted this standard, the records in the
ads.txt file in these sites included even more third-party domains than news/media.
Note that no government hosted an ads.txt file in this scenario.
Analysis through the ad related traffic
When analyzing ad related traffic generated in Latin American sites, as a result
of browsing from LATAM and EU, we can see that, in general, web traffic from
EU triggers a little more ad related tracking than traffic from LATAM, except in
Chile and Peru. This was illustrated in Fig. 5.17 where the mean number of ad
related requests spawned by country is presented. Websites from Argentina trigger,
by far, the highest intensity of ad related traffic, followed by Venezuela. The context
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Figure 5.16: ECDF % of web sites covered by third-party domains in Iberoamerican countries.
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Table 5.1: Number of websites having adopted the ads.txt standard in Iberoamerican countries by
category.
is certainly heterogenous but, as stated in previous paragraphs, the source of web
traffic might be influencing the ad related tracking derived when browsing LATAM
local sites.
We can see that traffic from EU to LATAM would trigger more ad related tracking
than traffic to LATAM. Thus, the location of users in this scenario would affect the
level of user tracking. Furthermore, if user browsing originates in LATAM and directs
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Table 5.2: Mean number of third-party domains found in ads.txt files by category of website in
Iberoamerican countries.
to top-world sites, this type of tracking increases notably; its proportion with respect
to all third-party traffic is, however, reduced. Consequently, we confirm that users
browsing very popular websites would be more exposed to ad related tracking.
Based on the content served by publishers, we found that categories news/media
and entertainment provoke the highest ad related traffic both when web traffic
comes from LATAM and from EU. For some countries, employment and weather
caused important ad related traffic. This is depicted in Figs. 5.18 and 5.19.
Moreover, the impact of this third-party traffic in government sites is minor, but it
is present in all countries, although, we feel, commercial advertising for profit should
not be engaged with public sites already funded by the taxes of citizens. We found
out 103 and 135 government sites triggering ad related tracking from visiting LATAM
sites locally and from EU, respectively. More than 90% of these government sites were
covered by third-party domains coupled with Google.
When measuring ad related requests triggered by web traffic to top-world pub-
lishers, news/media sites showed an important ad tracking activity, followed by
entertainment, as with the contexts analyzed previously. This is shown in 5.20.
However, in these very popular sites, a significant tracking activity is also observed
for several other categories such as employment, education and health. The intrinsic
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Figure 5.17: Mean number of ad related requests spawned from web traffic to LATAM when origi-
























































































Figure 5.18: Mean number of ad related requests triggered by local traffic.


















































































Figure 5.19: Mean number of ad related requests triggered by web traffic from EU to LATAM.
privacy risks involved in this interactions, thus, might be present in a wider spectrum
of publishers, including some categorized as education and health websites, which
could be collecting, processing and sharing very sensitive data.
We calculated the prevalence of these third-party entities along local websites
in Iberoamerica, and presented the data in Tables 5.3, and 5.4. We found that
Google owned domains were massively behind advertising traffic. In particular among
the 10 most prevalent third-party domains, at least half of them belonged to this
company. doubleclick.net, for example, appeared at more than 40% of the web sites
crawled from LATAM, a similar coverage of google.es when web traffic originated in
EU. Besides, the third-party domains involved and their prevalence vary if traffic to
LATAM originates in EU; the prevalence of some third-party domains along websites
is, in fact, slightly higher. Again, this would suggest that users browsing from EU
would be more exposed to the inherent user profiling and tracking of online advertising
than LATAM users.
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Table 5.3: Prevalence of third-party domains behind ad related traffic along websites visited in
Iberoamerican countries locally.
5.4 Conclusions
User location affects the intensity of third-party traffic, including advertising related
flows of information, triggered from browsing Iberoamerican websites. This is evident
first when assessing local web traffic, i.e., when browsing these sites from their country















Table 5.4: Prevalence of third-party domains behind ad related traffic along websites visited in
Iberoamerican countries from EU.
among them in this respect. But the influence of location is also shown when mea-
suring the interactions spawned by web traffic from EU to LATAM. We found out
that traffic originating in EU spawns more third-party interactions. Despite stricter
privacy regulations in EU, users from such locations would be more exposed than
users from LATAM to the targeting and profiling performed by external trackers.
Interestingly, the total number of potential trackers (third-party domains) found
behind third-party requests, including ad related requests, is similar either web traffic
is local or from EU. It seems the same entities are involved in third-party traffic but
change their tracking strategy depending on the location of the user.
Users from particular locations might be more “relevant” for online tracking and
advertising. Despite the very small population of some countries, the level of third-
party traffic derived from them is comparable to that of other huge countries. Portugal
is an example.
When top-world sites are the destination of web traffic generated from Iberoamer-
ica, the user location parameter is less relevant to the intensity of potential third-party
tracking, since the mean number of requests triggered is similar among the source
Iberoamerican countries. Privacy risks arise higher in this context since more third-
party requests are spawned and significantly more third-party domains are found
behind.
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Websites or publishers whose content falls into the categories news/media, entertainment
or shopping/travel showed the greatest levels of potential third-party tracking and
third-party entities. Thus, the interactions with said websites might entail more pri-
vacy risks, as corroborated by previous work in different contexts. Note that when
web traffic goes to top-world websites, this risk is extended to other categories related
to the collection of sensitive data, such as health or education.
The level of adoption of the ads.txt standard in LATAM is still low compared to
that of the EU. The information it reveals is valuable to study the third-parties (ad
exchanges) officially coupled with publishers. It evidences the concentration of adver-
tising in a single company, Google; and in publishers associated with the categories
news/media, entertainment or shopping/travel.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
Online advertising is based on tracking technologies to “follow” and monitor users
wherever they browse on the Web. Over time, during such tracking, a lot of metadata
is collected about a user, which can be employed to build detailed profiles. Moreover,
due to the pervasiveness of online advertising, billions of users get involved in this
process. Such range and the powerful personalization technologies considered have
made online advertising a millionaire business whose revenues are said to be financing
the current free Internet access model.
Since this successful business revolves around the massive exploitation of user
data, there are multiple privacy concerns. This is compounded by the complexity and
opacity of the internal structure of the online advertising ecosystem, which further
complicates the study of privacy risks, and limits the implementation of protection
approaches. As a consequence, privacy protection initiatives neglect important pa-
rameters, such as the sustainability of the entire system, making them impractical in
the long term.
To address this issue, we have performed an exhaustive and global overview of the
potential hazards to user privacy in the online advertising ecosystem. An attacker
model was built upon the capabilities of main players and the variety of user data
likely to be collected. This model encompasses a taxonomy of the roles that potential
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attackers might play according, e.g., to their position in the landscape or the amount
of user data items they are capable of collecting. Most of the privacy risks arise from
ad platforms’ intrinsic weaknesses that include non-transparent infrastructure for
users, massive collection of user data by thousands intermediary entities, disincentives
to incorporate protection strategies, unregulated cooperation among third parties,
non-consented collection of granular user data, use of insecure channels to transport
sensitive data, and intrusive tracking mechanisms to identify users. In a nutshell,
the ecosystem entails a surveillance infrastructure devoted to identify and capture
the attention of users. If this where not enough, the participation of users is entirely
passive in the ad delivery process, although their interactions fuel the operation of
online advertising services.
The consequence of the procedures implemented within this ecosystem is a massive
trade of user profiles to perform an abusive identification and classification of users,
which could even lead to discrimination. Furthermore, the mechanisms developed to
support online tracking and advertising could be so intrusive that persist even after
users explicitly delete their fingerprints. Commonly, cookies are used to identify users
and track them, and, in combination with other technologies such as canvas, device
fingerprinting or cookie matching, to allow cooperation among online advertising
entities..
In line with our methodical analysis of privacy risks, we researched available pro-
tection approaches. A taxonomy was also construed to organize these contributions.
Most of the solutions we have found were based on local mechanisms that block third-
party interactions triggered from users to online advertising platforms, thus stopping
user data leakage. Other filtering approaches were envisioned as brokers that, interest-
ingly, would allow an active integration of users into the advertising ecosystem. Said
integration implies providing more transparency and control for users, even though
blocking third-party tracking might be affecting the economic model of the Web.
Advertising schemes offering native privacy have been proposed but unfortunately
involve important modifications of the current structure, thus complicating their im-
plementation.
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With the aim of scrutinizing the privacy risks arising within the context of ad
platforms, we take advantage of data obtained from bid interactions released by a
known Chinese DSP. In particular, messages sent by an ad platform to DSPs, inviting
them to participate in auctions, contain granular data about users’ behavior. Since
this data might be distributed, without regulation, among hundreds of such DSPs,
they become potential massive surveillance entities, even at a very low cost. This is
partially due to the power given to advertisers to target users with very high precision.
In order to mitigate this problem, we have proposed reducing the amount of
DSPs that receive bid requests while preserving the revenue of the system. Unlike
radical blocking approaches, probably impractical in the long term, we have looked
for a balanced trade-off between the number of invited DSPs (trying to preserve
privacy) and revenue. An optimal solution is mathematically viable that maximizes
revenue while bounding the participation of DSPs. When applying it, though revenue
certainly increases with the number of invited DSPs, an important portion of revenue
is still preserved even a significant reduction in the DSPs is enforced. Interestingly,
this strategy, i.e., penalizing abusing DSPs, could encourage them to “behave” better.
[Conclusions last paper]
6.2 Future Work
The complexity of online advertising poses various challenges to user privacy. From
the analysis conducted in the previous sections, we envisage two main lines of future
research: identifying new privacy threats and providing new protection mechanisms.
Given the opacity of ad platforms, we believe that further exploring the tracking
capabilities of the advertising industry will help discover their potential to become
privacy attackers. But not only that, unveiling the user data exchange processes
within ad platforms would expose the extent to which some of their intermediate
entities are prone to become massive surveillance agents. A better knowledge of the
adversary will contribute to develop protection mechanisms which are more tailored
to the above mentioned privacy threats.
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As for privacy mechanisms, a natural next step would be combining some of the
proposals described in Sec. 3.3. Such synergy shall generate more robust and useful
privacy solutions for detecting user-related flaws and invasive tracking behaviors, and
better adapting privacy enhancing technologies to the current Web economic model.
Regarding the strategy posed by current privacy protection approaches (namely
blocking, obfuscation, sandboxing, and user inclusion), a further analysis on their im-
pact on the Web economic model will reveal if such proposals are effectively adapting
to the current advertising business model, without a significant side effect.
A further research direction for improving users’ privacy in online advertising is
to create smarter protection tools in the user side, that is, developed as browser
complements. Intelligibility, usability and flexibility are some of the parameters that
need to be considered to enable mechanisms to give users real transparency and
control over their browsing data. In this regard, a great deal of work has to be done
to develop tools that let users effectively enforce their motivations on the protection
strategy selected.
Another strand of research may consider the scope of the protection strategy,
currently limited to the user side. Extending the scope of the privacy protection
mechanisms to the different players (e.g., publishers, advertisers, ad exchanges) might
result in a more solid approach. Accordingly, analyzing and evaluating the privacy
policies and protection mechanisms offered by ad platforms might contribute to detect
their flaws and make improvements.
To go beyond the simplistic (and endangering) blocking strategy of some ap-
proaches examined in Sec. 3.3, new advertising models have to be envisioned that
provide flexible two-way communication interfaces between users and ad platforms
through which they could directly manage their relationship according to their inter-
ests. While economic interest of advertising entities are widely known, user motiva-
tions related to privacy, advertising choices and even economic incentives should be
seriously considered by such models. Undoubtedly, more transparent and balanced
interactions will derive in an increased sense of security and thus of privacy.
A more user-driven advertising platform, where user interests regarding their pri-
vacy and profit may be variable (not always opposing to the advertisers’), and the
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assessment of user information as an asset with intrinsic economic value, not only for
intermediate advertising entities, but also for users, will help to study the trade-off
between such value and the privacy of users involved in online advertising transac-
tions.
Furthermore, the ad delivery model itself must be rethinked because its com-
ponents can implement privacy more effectively, in particular, concerning powerful
privacy techniques such as data minimization and transparency for users.
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